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Introduction 
Is Facebook’s role in the spread of incitement in Myanmar criminal? 
In 2018, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar (FFM) described Facebook’s “significant role” in 
the spread of incitement to discrimination and violence against 
Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims.2 Although the FFM described in detail 
the speakers’ responsibility for the Facebook posts, the precise nature 
of Facebook’s responsibility in moderating (or failing to moderate) 
harmful content was unclear.  
Facebook’s tragedy in Myanmar is a striking example of how 
international law’s current regimes of responsibility for incitement to 
genocide results in a gap. The extant regime, with its focus on states 
and natural persons, is incapable of fully accounting for the different 
actors and technologies involved in the rich and complex narrative of 
mass violence. One popular response to the lack of corporate liability is 
to expand domestic and international prosecution of legal or juridical 
persons.3 However, by evaluating the role of social media platforms in 
the spread of incitement, particularly the damage wrought by Facebook 
in Myanmar, this article hopes to contribute to that literature by 
showing how crime can operate as a cognitive constraint in appreciating 
different modalities of corporate involvement in situations of mass 
atrocity. By emancipating ourselves from this dominant cognitive 
frame, we can imagine a broader network of international liabilities. 
One possibility is tort. For this purpose, Facebook’s ban of Myanmar’s 
commander-in-chief from the platform4 merits further consideration. It 
remarkably embodies a regulatory paradox, where the traditional roles 
of regulator (state) and regulated entity (non-state) are reversed. This 
article examines the implications of the exercise of this awesome power 
in articulating an international tort liability and establishing a related 
mechanism.  
--- 
 
2. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Int’l Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/64, ¶ 74 (Sept. 12, 2018) 
[hereinafter FFM Report Summary]. 
3. See, e.g., Oliver Salas, Corporate Liability of Energy/Natural Resources 
Companies at National Law for Breach of International Human Rights 
Norms, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (Dec. 31, 2011), 
https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/dissertation_finaldraft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4Y2-GFJ3].  
4. Removing Myanmar Military Official from Facebook, FACEBOOK, 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/ (last 
updated Dec. 18, 2018). 
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At an international symposium held in 2019 on the subject of Law 
and Atrocity Prevention, I was asked to speak on a panel about 
“regulating social media that fosters atrocity crimes.”5 The word choice 
for the panel discussion – “fosters” — was very telling. It reveals the 
uncertain legal character of social media companies’ involvement in 
instances of incitement to violence posted on the platform, including 
the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under the 
Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute (alternatively, “incitement 
to genocide”).6 Such ambivalence was similarly apparent in the FFM 
report. The FFM found that ultranationalist monks, military leaders, 
and government officials were responsible for posts that constituted 
incitement to violence and persecution against the Rohingya Muslims 
of Myanmar’s Rakhine State.7 Discriminatory rhetoric and calls for 
violence created a social environment which facilitated the armed 
confrontations between Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – and the 
non-state armed group, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. This, in 
turn, resulted in the present Rohingya refugee crisis.8  
In contrast, the FFM’s description of Facebook’s involvement was 
less straightforward: 
The Mission has no doubt that the prevalence of hate speech in 
Myanmar significantly contributed to increased tension and a 
climate in which individuals and groups may become more 
receptive to incitement and calls for violence. This also applies to 
hate speech on Facebook. The extent to which the spread of 
messages and rumours on Facebook has increased discrimination 
and violence in Myanmar must be independently and thoroughly 
researched, so that appropriate lessons can be drawn and similar 
scenarios prevented. Similarly, the impact of the recent measures 
 
5. Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Atrocity Prevention: The 
Role of International Law and Justice - Part 3, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kT_wdRS2pGA. 
6. Long, supra note 4; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
art. 25(3)(e), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
art. III(c), Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention]. 
7. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, ¶ 1319, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Detailed 
Findings of the FFM]. 
8. See id.; Rohingya Refugee Crisis, U.N. NEWS, 
https://news.un.org/en/focus/rohingya-refugee-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/2W6H-FBG5].  
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taken by Facebook to prevent and remedy the abuse of its 
platform needs to be assessed.9 
The FFM found that social media played a “significant” role in the 
spread of incitement in Myanmar, and that Facebook served as a 
“useful instrument” for hate speech10 “in a context where for most users 
Facebook is the Internet.”11 To be used, to serve as an instrument – by 
using the passive voice to describe Facebook’s actions, the FFM 
obscured the platform’s agency and avoided the attribution of legal 
responsibility to Facebook as a company engaged in the business of 
content moderation. Such silence is to be expected. International law 
has only recognized two regimes of legal responsibility – for states and 
natural persons – in regulating incitement to genocide. The Genocide 
Convention imposes on states the duty to prevent and punish genocide 
within their borders (including incitement to genocide),12 while 
international criminal law prosecutes natural persons for statements 
amounting to direct and public incitement to commit genocide.13 In 
contrast, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
 
9. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1354. Even prior to the 
release of the FFM report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee expressed concern that Facebook 
had been a site of incitement to violence against the Rohingya. Similarly, 
FFM Chair Marzuki Darusman described Facebook to have played a 
“determining role” in the conflict and have “substantively contributed to 
the level of acrimony and dissension and conflict in Myanmar. See Tom 
Miles, U.N. Investigators Cite Facebook Role in Myanmar Crisis, 
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
rohingya-facebook/u-n-investigators-cite-facebook-role-in- myanmar-
crisis-idUSKCN1GO2PN [https://perma.cc/AR9N-97XN]; Eli Meixler, 
U.N. Fact-finders Say Facebook Played a Determining Role in Violence 
Against the Rohingya, TIME (Mar. 12, 
2018),  http://time.com/5197039/un-facebook- myanmar-rohingya-
violence/ [https://perma.cc/A6D2-5AV6]. 
10. I use the term “hate speech” here following the FFM’s terminology, but 
note the lack of definition of hate speech under international law and the 
varying treatment across jurisdictions on hate speech legislation. 
Incitement to violence, however, constitutes a narrower scope of 
prohibited expression. See generally Hate Speech Explained: A Toolkit, 
ARTICLE 19 (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.article19.org/resources/hate-
speech-explained-a-toolkit/ [https://perma.cc/78J4-AZK8]; Susan 
Benesch et al., Dangerous Speech: A Practical Guide, DANGEROUS SPEECH 
PROJECT (Jan. 9, 2020), https://dangerousspeech.org/guide/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QGE-TRYC] (coining the word “dangerous speech” 
and differentiating it from “hate speech”). 
11. FFM Report summary, supra note 2, ¶ 74.  
12. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. V, VIII. 
13. Id. art. III(c), art. IV. 
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(UNGPs) provide a template to guide corporate conduct without 
assuming the form of legal obligation.14  
Calls for accountability have been consistent with this framework. 
The FFM recommended investigation for possible genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes; the UN Independent Investigative 
Mechanism for Myanmar was established soon after to collect and 
preserve evidence that may be used in a court of law.15 Separately, the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is now looking 
into acts of deportation that spilled onto neighboring Bangladesh, a 
state party to the Rome Statute.16 This would circumvent Myanmar’s 
status as a non-state party to the treaty and allow the prosecution of 
individuals found to be most responsible for the deportation of the 
Rohingya.17 Demand for state responsibility ensued. In November 2019, 
The Gambia filed an application before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) concerning Myanmar’s alleged violation of its erga omnes 
obligations under the Genocide Convention, which Myanmar is a party 
to.18 Importantly, The Gambia devoted a substantial portion of its 
application to describe the “hate propaganda” against the Rohingya.19 
In an unprecedented order, the ICJ granted jurisdiction to rule on The 
Gambia’s request for provisional measures and enjoined Myanmar to 
 
14. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. 
OF THE HIGH COMM’R (2011), 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusine
sshr_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSD2-XAUX] [hereinafter UNGPs]. 
15. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 9, ¶¶ 63, 1441, 1511, 1711; U.N. 
Human Rights Council, Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights 
Council on 24 March 2017, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/34/22 (Apr. 3, 
2017) (creating the FFM); U.N. Human Rights Council, Situation of 
human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, ¶ 
22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/L.22 (Sept. 25, 2018) (creating the Independent 
Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar). 
16. Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union 
of Myanmar, ICC-01/19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ¶ 
43 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_06955.PDF [https://perma.cc/T7S8-
RMUQ].  
17. Id. 
18. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Application Instituting Proceedings 
and Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 15 (Nov. 11, 2019). 
19. Id. ¶¶ 37–46. 
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prevent further acts of genocide within its borders, including the crime 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.20 
Myanmar’s incitement landscape thus presents a striking picture of 
how international law’s current regimes of responsibility appear to 
result in a gap, incapable of fully accounting for the different actors and 
technologies involved in the rich and complex narrative of mass 
violence. Recent trends to address the lacuna for corporate liability in 
mass atrocity contexts involve hardening the soft law framework 
contained in the UNGPs through a legally binding instrument, which 
would impose on states the obligation to prosecute juridical persons at 
the national level,21 and to expand the coverage of the Rome Statute to 
allow the prosecution of juridical persons before the ICC.22 These 
movements comprise two sides of the same coin. Although my paper is 
not focused on individually evaluating these approaches, much less urge 
proponents to abandon criminal law altogether, I argue broadly that 
such approaches exhibit an unquestioning attitude towards the primacy 
of crime to conceptualize harm, which can operate as a cognitive 
constraint in appreciating different modalities of corporate involvement 
in mass atrocity contexts. 
As various scholars, legislators, and policymakers develop 
theoretical and policy approaches to regulate social media,23 this article 
 
20. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Order, Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 37, 86 (Jan. 23, 2020). 
21. See UN Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human 
Rights, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human 
Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises (revised draft as of July 16, 2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCo
rp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf. [https://perma.cc/V53H-VXCU]. 
22. Id. art. 6(7)(a).  
23. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled 
Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 Nᴏᴛʀᴇ Dᴀᴍᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ. 1035, 1037-
42 (2018) (discussing the dangers of the European Commission’s Code of 
Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online); B-Tech Project, U.N. 
HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/B-TechProject.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/JM67-CPZ2] (seeking “to provide authoritative 
guidance and resources to enhance the quality of implementation of the 
United National Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights with 
respect to a selected number of strategic focus areas in the technology 
space”); UN Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35, ¶ 2 (Apr. 6, 2018) (recommending 
human rights principles for content moderation); Ben Wagner, Can 
Germany’s ‘Lex Facebook’ Be Saved? A Business and Human Rights 
Analysis, GLOBAL VOICES (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://globalvoices.org/2018/03/13/can-germanys-lex-facebook-be-
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hopes to contribute to the conversation by showing how the language 
of crime can limit our conceptual thinking of harm. By freeing ourselves 
from this dominant cognitive frame, a broader network of international 
liabilities is up for imagining. One possibility is international tort 
liability. For this purpose, Facebook’s ban of Myanmar’s commander-
in-chief from the platform deserves consideration.24 It remarkably 
embodies a regulatory paradox, where the traditional roles of regulator 
(state) and regulated entity (non-state) are reversed. This highlights 
the agency of social media platforms and the process of content 
moderation that lies at the heart of their business. As Tarleton Gillespie 
defines, a “platform” is an online site or service where content is 
provided by users but the company offering the technology moderates 
user content and activity as an “essential” (rather than “ancillary”) 
undertaking.25 This article examines the exercise of private regulation 
of state actors’ speech – in the form of content moderation – in distilling 
generalizable principles for an international tort liability and the 
institutional design of a related mechanism, extending Maya Steinitz’s 
blueprint for an International Court of Civil Justice (alternatively, 
ICCJ).26 
It bears emphasizing that the focus on Facebook is not intended to 
single out one platform; rather, it is meant to provide a legal-theoretical 
 
saved-a-business-and-human-rights-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/9J2W-
HYA9]; Regulating Social Media: We Need a New Model that Protects 
Free Expression, ARTICLE 19, (Apr.  25, 2018), 
https://www.article19.org/resources/regulating-social-media-need-new-
model-protects-free-expression/  
24. Long, supra note 4. 
25. TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, 
CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL 
MEDIA 18-23, 40 (2018) (defining “platform” as “online sites and services 
that (a) host, organize, and circulate users’ shared content or social 
interactions for them, (b) without having produced or commissioned (the 
bulk of) that content, (c) built on an infrastructure, beneath that 
circulation of information, for processing data for customer service, 
advertising, and profit,” and (d) whose essential function includes the 
moderation of content and user activity through “some logistics of 
detection, review, and enforcement”). In contrast, the term “platform” 
conjures a picture of “progressiveness” and “egalitarianism” which 
suggests a myth of neutrality. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of 
‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y, May 1, 2010, at 347, 349-351; Jack 
M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1149, 1151 (2018) (arguing that free speech problems in any era “are 
shaped by the communications technology available for people to use and 
by the ways that people actually use that technology”). 
26. Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014).  
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response to what other experts have already commented upon.27 It is 
also meant to function as a cautionary tale for technologies operating 
in incitement contexts. 28 The term “speech” used in this article refers 
to the full range of modalities of expression. This article will proceed in 
four parts. Part I begins with an account of Myanmar’s speech 
landscape following the country’s political transition, and Facebook’s 
role in shaping public discourse against the Rohingya. Part II provides 
an overview of prohibited speech under international law and the 
current regimes of legal responsibility for incitement to genocide. 
Laying out the legal landscape for speech in this manner will reveal how 
extant regimes result in a gap in liability for corporate involvement in 
mass atrocity crimes. Part III discusses the common response to this 
gap – to push for the prosecution of juridical or legal persons, whether 
domestically or internationally. However, I will argue, using Facebook 
in Myanmar as an example, how translating harm in the language of 
crime can eclipse other cognitive frames, such as tort. Part IV briefly 
sketches the promise of international tort liability and the contours of 
an international mechanism, building on Steinitz’s blueprint for an 
International Court of Civil Justice. 
I. Background 
The outbreak of violence in October 2016 and August 2017 in 
Myanmar’s Rakhine state forms the factual situation of the ICC’s 
investigation.29 These attacks did not spring from nowhere; they were 
the culmination of decades of government-orchestrated communal 
tension between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims.30 In the 
years preceding the attacks, “nationalistic political parties and 
politicians, leading monks, academics, prominent individuals, and 
 
27. See sources cited, supra note 23. 
28. For instance, after Facebook banned Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing 
from the platform, Myanmar military accounts started to appear in the 
Russian social media platform, VKontakte. After Facebook ban, Myanmar 
military accounts are moving to Russian social media site Vkontakte, 
GLOBAL VOICES ADVOX (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://advox.globalvoices.org/2018/09/07/after-facebook-ban-
myanmar-military-accounts-are-moving-to-russian-social-media-site-
vkontakte/ [https://perma.cc/3EJ4-GGZ2]. 
29. Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of Myanmar, 
Case No. ICC-01/19, Prosecutor’s Request for Authorisation of an 
Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 5 (July 4, 2019), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03510.PDF (stating that “the 2017 wave 
of violence was closely related to another wave of violence that started on 
or about 9 October 2016”). 
30. See Francis Wade, MYANMAR’S ENEMY WITHIN: BUDDHIST VIOLENCE AND 
THE MAKING OF A MUSLIM ‘OTHER’ (2017). 
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members of the Government”31 had fanned the flames of animosity 
through incendiary rhetoric.32 At key political moments, the Myanmar 
government manufactured communal tension to distract the general 
public from pressing economic problems and/or justify the Tatmadaw’s 
reign.33 The FFM identified many statements advocating for national, 
racial, or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence prohibited under Article 20 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and which the FFM 
concluded may even constitute persecution in the context of crimes 
against humanity under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.34  
The Rohingya bear the brunt of the animosity, further entrenching 
their status as stateless persons and therefore, outsiders, in Myanmar.35 
For instance, the Rohingya were commonly depicted as a foreigner36 
despite many of them having lived in Myanmar prior to British colonial 
rule.37 Pejorative descriptions of Rohingya as “kalar,” “liar,” “Bengalis 
that sneaked in,” and “unwanted persons” manifested this bias.38 
Religion, national identity, and existential threat were interwoven 
seamlessly, such that a threat to racial and religious purity constituted 
 
31. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 696. 
32. Id. ¶ 728 (noting the government’s portrayal of violence beginning in 2012 
as “intercommunal” and attributed to a coordinated plan to “instigate 
violence and build tensions”). See also Wade, supra note 30.  
33. Wade, supra note 30, at 34, 108–09.  
34. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶¶ 696-748, 1319.  
35. The Rohingya are not considered citizens under Myanmar’s 1982 
Citizenship Act. See Citizenship and Human Rights in Myanmar: Why 
Law Reform is Urgent and Possible, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS (June 
2019), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Myanmar-
Citizenship-law-reform-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2019-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8NV-FZ7Q]; Tools of Genocide: National 
Verification Cards and the Denial of Citizenship of Rohingya Muslims in 
Myanmar, FORTIFY RIGHTS, at 44 (2019), 
https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Tools%20of%20Genocide%20-
%20Fortify%20Rights%20-%20September-03-2019-EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/38EC-KNW8]. 
36. Matt Schissler, Matthew J. Walton & Phyu Phyu Thi, Reconciling 
Contradictions: Buddhist-Muslim Violence, Narrative Making and 
Memory in Myanmar, 47 J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA, July 2017, at 376; 
Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, INT’L CRISIS GROUP, at 7-9 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/290-buddhism-
and-state-power-in-myanmar.pdf. 
37. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶¶ 4724–4773; See Thant 
Myint-U, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF BURMA: RACE, CAPITALISM, AND THE 
CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 2020). 
38. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1312–1313.  
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a matter of national security.39 Anti-Muslim narratives abroad, such as 
the US “war on terror,” were exploited to reinforce manufactured 
prejudices.40 This fed the narrative that the Rohingya were a threat not 
only to Myanmar’s Bamar ethnic group, but also to the predominant 
Buddhist religion.41 It affirmed the genuine fear felt by many that if the 
“Western Gate” of the country had not been protected against Muslim 
Bengals, then “Myanmar and the rest of Buddhist South East Asia 
would have been Muslim a long time ago.”42  
Myanmar’s democratization in 2011 from decades of military rule 
was a harbinger of a new era. For one, the law and practice of pre-
publication censorship were abolished. Prior to this, articles required 
“careful vetting by the censor board,” and those deemed a threat to 
national security were literally cut out from the publication. 43 The 
political transition was also marked by “open trade policies and 
privatization.”44 The telecommunications industry was liberalized soon 
after. This, again, was groundbreaking. Before transition, “the Internet 
was only available to a select few, as it was prohibitively expensive.”45 
 
39. Wade, supra note 30, at 195 (noting that the “nation had become so 
deeply entwined with the faith that one could not be distinguished from 
the other”); Jonathan Liljeblad, The Efficacy of National Human Rights 
Institutions Seen in Context: Lessons from the Myanmar National Human 
Rights Commission, 19 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 95, 113 (2017) 
(describing the position of the Tatmadaw as a “defender of national unity 
and peace”). 
40. Matt Schissler, On Islamophobes and Holocaust Deniers: Making Sense of 
Violence, in Myanmar and Elsewhere, CONFLICT IN MYANMAR: WAR, 
POLITICS, RELIGION 283, 292 (Nick Cheesman and Nicholas Farrelly, eds. 
2016): (“...the use of global arguments about Muslims elsewhere is an 
important part of reinforcing a sense of general threat from Muslims at 
home. This is a parallel, but in Myanmar it also appears to be a productive 
interrelationship: the strand of argument about Islam in the world that is 
used to bolster a larger narrative of Muslim threat in Myanmar explicitly 
draws on discourses that have grown into global prominence as a part of 
the ‘War on Terror’”); Wade, supra note 30, at 83. 
41. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1314–1317; Wade, supra 
note 30, at 195-96.  
42. Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, supra note 36, at 7, 9.  
43. Wade, supra note 30, at 102. 
44. Susan Banki and Ja Seng Ing, Precarity and Risk in Myanmar’s Media: 
A Longitudinal Analaysis of Natural Disaster Coverage by The Irrawaddy, 
MYANMAR MEDIA IN TRANSITION: LEGACIES, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE 
191 (Lisa Brooten, Jane Madlyn McElhone, Gayathry Venkiteswaran, 
eds., 2019); Amy Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy, 
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 287, 293 (2000) (noting that the version of capitalism 
and the kind of democratic transition unfolding in many developing 
countries is not the same as what happened in the developed world).  
45. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1343 
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Pre-2011, a mobile SIM card cost around US $1,500-2,000; by 2011, it 
cost US $1.50.46 Mobile phones became affordable and broadband 
subscriptions increased.47 Thus, the country woke up from five decades 
of military rule greeted by smartphones; this was the populace’s “first 
experience with any form of telephony.”48  
Social media platforms gained more users as access to the Internet 
became easier.49 Facebook currently enjoys an estimated 20 million 
active users50 of the country’s 54 million demographic.51 Unsurprisingly, 
hate speech flourished on the platform.52 Facebook posts helped 
 
46. Jason Motlagh, When a SIM Card Goes From $2000 to $1.50: Myanmar 
opens its wireless market, cuing a frenzy, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-29/myanmar-opens-
its-mobile-phone-market-cuing-carrier-frenzy [https://perma.cc/F6U7-
Y72U]. 
47. Myanmar’s mobile revolution, BANGKOK POST (Jun. 20, 2016), 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1015225/myanmars-mobile-
revolution [https://perma.cc/WUR6-4TY2]; Detailed Findings of the 
FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1342; Michelle J. Foster, The Business Environment 
for News Media in Myanmar: 2018, INTERNEWS (2018), 
https://internews.org/resource/business-environment-news-media-
myanmar-2018 [https://perma.cc/V2BQ-59TU] (finding that mobile 
phone penetration has exceeded 100% as of 2018). 
48. Lorian Leong, Mobile Myanmar: The Development of a Mobile App 
Culture in Yangon, 5 MOBILE MEDIA & COMMUNICATION 139, 140 (2017) 
(stating that Huawei and Android dominated the market as of 2014). 
49. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1344, n.2975 (“It is 
suggested that Facebook enjoys more than 90 per cent share among social 
media platforms in Myanmar, and that this has been so since 2012.”). As 
of August 2019, Facebook enjoys almost 95% market share in the country. 
Social Media Stats in Myanmar - February 2020, STATCOUNTER 
GLOBALSTATS, http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-
stats/all/myanmar [https://perma.cc/2BV2-37JM]; Catherine 
Trautwein, Facebook Racks Up 10m Myanmar Users, MYANMAR TIMES 
(June 13, 2016), https://www.mmtimes.com/business/technology/20816-
facebook-racks-up-10m-myanmar-users.html. For an anecdotal account, 
see Craig Mod, The Facebook-Loving Farmers of Myanmar, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/the-facebook-
loving-farmers-of-myanmar/424812/. See also Leong, supra note 48, at 
11-12 (discussing how mobile shop-keepers acted as “warm gatekeepers” 
for mobile users who were not digitally literate, by installing apps in 
mobile phones remarkably without receiving any financial incentive from 
app companies) 
50. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 9, ¶ 1344. 
51. Myanmar Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/myanmar-population/ 
[https://perma.cc/NN4P-TE6L]. 
52. See Sticks and Stones: Hate Speech Narratives and Facilitators in 
Myanmar, C4ADS (2016), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/56b
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reinforce public discourse against the Rohingya by “extending” pre-
existing relationships and cultural practices. The echo-chamber effect 
of the platform, where users’ newsfeed would show content conforming 
to their preferences, facilitated the “visually assisted claim-making” 
that has proven useful for portraying the image of Muslims as a religious 
“Other,” and whose seemingly evil practices clashed with Buddhism’s 
virtues.53 Facebook posts thus merged “into a sonic background in 
which their recurrence [was] significant not for their detail but for their 
tonal consistency,” a “mnemonic recitation” confirming “both the 
existence of the threat as perceived and, also, of the community of 
perceivers.”54 
With the sudden opening of the country to democracy, foreign 
investment, and technology, Myanmar has been confronted with what 
Amy Chua calls “the paradox of free-market democracy”.55 Developing 
nations are suddenly bombarded by market-compatible ideologies on 
one hand, and “potentially market-subversive” ethno-nationalism on 
the other hand. 56 As mentioned, purveyors of hate speech ranged from 
 
41f1ff8baf3b237782313/1454645026098/Sticks+and+Stones.pdf; Detailed 
Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1310, 1352. This conclusion is 
supported by academic scholarship highlighting the paradoxical 
“emancipatory capacity” of the Internet and mobile devices in developing 
nations, along with the ability to “enhance existing social, economic, and 
knowledge divides.” Leong, supra note 48, at 143 (citing Sinikka Sassi, 
Cultural Differentiation or Social Segregation? Four Approaches to the 
Digital Divide, 7 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY, October 2005, at 684; DiMaggio 
et al., Digital Inequality: From Unequal Access to Differentiated Use, in 
SOCIAL INEQUALITY 355 (Kathryn Neckerman ed., 2004); PIPPA NORRIS, 
DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE 
INTERNET WORLDWIDE (2001); Jan A.G.M. van Dijk, Digital Divide 
Research, Achievements and Shortcomings, 34 POETICS 221 (2006)).  
53. GERARD MCCARTHY, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 
95-96 (Adam Simpson, Nicholas Farrelly & Ian Holliday eds., 2018) 
(discussing, as an example, the disaster relief operations which both 
Muslims and Buddhists used to portray that their respective religions 
were models of virtue and selflessness that the other group apparently did 
not possess). 
54. Matt Schissler, New Technologies, Established Practices: Developing 
Narratives of Muslim Threat in Myanmar, ISLAM AND THE STATE IN 
MYANMAR: MUSLIM-BUDDHIST RELATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF 
BELONGING 211, 232 (Melissa Crouch ed., 2015). See also Leong, supra 
note 48, at 143 (discussing how mobile phone studies show how users 
“incorporate cultures and cultural needs into mobile phones, expressed in 
language, habits, and assistance”). 
55. Chua, supra note 44, at 288. 
56. Id. at 315 (defining ethnonationalism is one in which the nation is “defined 
in terms of assumed blood ties and ethnicity”). See also Buddhism and 
State Power in Myanmar, supra note 36, at 8 (describing Buddhist 
nationalist sentiments against economic networks of the Chinese in 
Mandalay and Taunggyi).  
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ultranationalist monks, military generals, local and national 
government officials, and politicians, including members of the National 
League for Democracy (NLD), the political party of State Counsellor 
Aung San Suu Kyi.57 These figures used Facebook to manipulate the 
narrative on the Rohingya in two ways: first, they used the platform to 
post or share hate speech to a broader audience; second, they 
maintained official Facebook pages and accounts that easily connected 
them with like-minded constituents. This rendered the platform an 
important aspect of political life in Myanmar.58 
Ashin Wirathu, a member of the MaBaTha (“Association for the 
Protection of Race and Religion” renamed “The Buddha Dhamma 
Charity Foundation”59), was the most outspoken monk responsible for 
spreading hateful rhetoric. His aggressive lobbying led to the passage of 
the controversial Protection of Race and Religion Laws in 2015, which 
targeted Muslim cultural practices. 60 These laws disallow polygamous 
marriages, regulate the marriage of Buddhist women to non-Buddhist 
men, and require birth spacing for women from certain ethnic groups.61 
Wirathu also used the derogatory word “Mout Kalar” to generally refer 
to Muslims, including Rohingya.62 Even the late U Ko Ni, a prominent 
Muslim advisor to the NLD,63 was a regular target of Wirathu’s vitriolic 
posts.64 Wirathu referred to him as a “Mout Kalar MP” or “Mout Kalar 
Nga Ni,” and questioned his role as a Muslim in Myanmar politics.65 
 
57. See Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 696. 
58. See id. 
59. Moe Moe, Ma Ba Tha Changes Name, Still Officially Illegal, THE 
IRRAWADDY (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/ma-ba-
tha-changes-name-still-officially-illegal.html; Htet Naing Zaw, Ma Ba Tha 
is a Necessity: Military, THE IRRAWADDY (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ma-ba-tha-necessity-
military.html. 
60. Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, supra note 36, at 11. 
61. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 600. For a concise account 
of MaBaTha’s prominence in Myanmar’s Buddhist-majority society, see 
id. at 10-11. For a brief description of the Race and Religion Laws, see id. 
at 11-13. See also Matthew Walton, What are Myanmar’s Buddhist 
Sunday Schools Teaching?, EAST ASIA FORUM (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/12/16/what-are-myanmars-
buddhist-sunday-schools-teaching/ (describing how MaBaTha, along with 
“different organisations have been creating networks of Buddhist Sunday 
schools in an attempt to instill Buddhist values in children”).  
62. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1312. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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When Facebook took down Wirathu’s page in late January 2018,66
 
the 
page had “hundreds of thousands of followers,”67
 
a substantial amount 
given the 18 million Facebook users in Myanmar then.68 Facebook 
banned MaBaTha and Wirathu for violating Facebook’s Dangerous 
Individuals and Organizations policy.69
 
 
The Myanmar civilian government and military, likewise 
responsible for spreading hate speech and false information against the 
Rohingya, also maintained Facebook pages.70 The Facebook page of the 
Tatmadaw’s Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min 
Aung Hlaing, had 2.9 million followers before it was taken down by 
Facebook in August 2018.71 Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s separate 
official Facebook page had 1.4 million followers before it was taken 
down.72 Other government agencies also amassed a huge social media 
following. The official page of the State Counsellor’s Information 
Committee has 400,000 followers,73 while that of the Ministry of 
Information has 1.5 million followers.74 The Facebook page of these two 
government agencies are still on the platform, despite having posted 
anti-Rohingya narratives in the past, as reported by the FFM.75 
Similarly, the newspaper, Global New Light of Myanmar, operated by 
the Ministry of Information and whose previous publications depicted 
 
66. Facebook Says Page of Firebrand Anti-Rohingya Myanmar Monk Wirathu 
Removed, THE STRAITS TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/facebook-says-page-of-
firebrand-anti- rohingya-myanmar-monk-wirathu-removed.  
67. Laignee Barron, Nationalist Monk Known as the ‘Burmese bin Laden’ 
Has Been Stopped From Spreading Hate on Facebook, TIME (Feb. 28, 
2018), http://time.com/5178790/facebook-removes-wirathu/. 
68. Facebook blacklists Myanmar hardline Buddhist group, FRONTIER 
MYANMAR (June 7, 2018), https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/facebook-
blacklists-myanmar-hardline-buddhist-group 
69. Id.; Sara Su, Update on Myanmar, FACEBOOK (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/update-on-myanmar/; Removing 
Myanmar Military Officials from Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/; 
Miles, supra note 9.  
70. See Removing Myanmar Military Officials from Facebook, supra note 69.  
71. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1329, n.2942. 
72. Id. ¶ 1329. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., id. ¶ 1340 (discussing how the State Counsellor’s Information 
Committee dismissed the allegations of sexual violence against the 
Rohingya as “fake rape”). See also id. ¶¶ 757 n.1619, 801 n.1762, 836 
n.1850, 846 n.1891, 857 n.1917, 866 n.1933. 
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all Rohingya, including civilians and children, as “ARSA terrorists”76 
continues to maintain a Facebook presence.77 It is unclear as to how 
Facebook interprets its Community Standards definition of “dangerous 
organizations”78 to justify the ban of one account while allowing others 
to stand. 
Other Facebook services were also used. In a notable example, two 
versions of a chain message were distributed through Facebook 
messenger in September 2017.79 One version called on Buddhists to 
“unite” against the common enemy in light of a supposedly planned 
jihad attack by Muslims on September 11 of that year.80 Another 
version contained the same message but with the actors reversed; 
Muslims were warned of a supposed impending attack by the MaBaTha 
and other ultranationalists on the same date. 81 In an interview with 
Vox in April 2018, Mark Zuckerberg shared that Facebook’s “systems” 
were able to detect this Facebook Messenger scam.82 Myanmar civil 
society organizations pushed back in an open letter addressed to 
Zuckerberg, arguing that the effective “systems” that he was describing 
were, in fact, the very same organizations that were alerting Facebook 
on the matter days after the fake content had already been widely 
shared.83
 
For years, civil society groups served as de facto monitors, 
flagging problematic content to Facebook officials.84 This underscored 
 
76. Id. ¶ 1335.  
77. The page has over 90,000 followers as of February 2020. The Global New 
Light of Myanmar (@TheGNLM), FACEBOOK, (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/TheGNLM/. 
78. See Banning More Dangerous Organizations from Facebook in Myanmar, 
FACEBOOK (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/02/dangerous-organizations-in-
myanmar/. 
79. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1348.  
80. Id. 
81. Id.; John Reed, Hate speech, Atrocities, and Fake News: The Crisis of 
Democracy in Myanmar, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/2003d54e-169a-11e8-9376-4a6390addb4. 
82. Jen Kirby, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s Role in Ethnic Cleansing in 
Myanmar: ‘It’s a Real Issue,’ Vox (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17183836/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-
myanmar-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing-genocide. 
83. Open letter from Myanmar civil society organizations, to Mark 
Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rs02G96Y9w5dpX0Vf1LjWp6B9mp32
VY-/view. 
84. Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in 
Myanmar, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-
facebook-hate/. At one point, members of Myanmar civil society would 
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the platform’s own inadequate controls.85 In the open letter, Myanmar 
civil society expressed their frustration with Facebook’s “over-reliance 
on third parties, a lack of a proper mechanism for emergency escalation, 
a reticence to engage local stakeholders around systemic solutions and 
a lack of transparency.” Zuckerberg issued an apology soon after.86 
As I have discussed elsewhere,87 Facebook’s user base in Myanmar 
involves both the ordinary citizen and the state. The official Facebook 
pages of Myanmar officials and government agencies demonstrate the 
reliance of state actors on the platform in carrying out official duty.
 
To 
an extent, this move is not different from US President Donald Trump’s 
use of Twitter to appeal directly to his political base.88 However, what 
appears to set apart Myanmar from other contexts is the broader speech 
landscape in which narratives are spun and gain traction. Myanmar’s 
transitional phase to democracy cannot be discounted. Although pre-
publication censorship was abolished,89 journalists and dissenters are 
 
bring up posts in a private messaging group that included both Myanmar 
civil society and Facebook employees such as Mia Garlick, then-policy 
director for Facebook for Asia-Pacific. Id. Garlick has since been 
reassigned to serve as Director of Policy for Australia and New Zealand. 
See Mia Garlick, FAMILY ONLINE SAFETY INSTITUTE, 
https://www.fosi.org/people/mia-garlick/ (last visited March 25, 2020).  
85. Removing Myanmar Military Officials From Facebook, supra note 70. See 
also Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1352 n.2991 (quoting 
a statement by Mark Zuckerberg before the United States Congress: 
“We’ve been too slow to deal with the hate and violence in places like 
Myanmar […]. The challenges we face in a country that has fast come 
online are very different than those in other parts of the world, and we 
are investing in people, technology, and programs to help address them 
as effectively as possible.”).  
86. Kevin Roose and Paul Mozur, Zuckerberg Was Called out Over Myanmar 
Violence. Here’s His Apology, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/business/facebook-myanmar-
zuckerberg.html. 
87. Jenny Domino, How Myanmar’s Incitement Landscape Can Inform 
Platform Regulation in Situations of Mass Atrocity, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 
2, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/02/how-myanmars-incitement-
landscape-can-inform-platform-regulation-in-situations-of-mass-atrocity/; 
Jenny Domino, How Facebook is Reconfiguring Speech in Situations of 
Mass Atrocity: Lessons from Myanmar and the Philippines, OPINIO JURIS 
(Jan. 1, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/01/01/how-facebook-is-
reconfiguring-freedom-of-speech-in-situations-of-mass-atrocity-lessons-
from-myanmar-and-the-philippines/. 
88. See Michael D. Shear et al., How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in Over 
11,000 Tweets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-
twitter-presidency.html. 
89. Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Government Abolishes Direct Media 
Censorship, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2012), 
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still heavily prosecuted under draconian defamation laws.90 This creates 
a chilling effect on public participation and free press coverage of 
sensitive political events.91 Further, state-owned media remain 
unmatched in terms of resources and reach,92 enabling the state to 
manage public discourse effectively. Ironically, democracy gave more 
impetus for state ownership of media channels as a way to “amplify the 
government’s messaging.”93 
Against this background, Facebook carved out a space where the 
“tea shop and the 8 o’clock news meet.”94 In the Myanmar context, the 
8 o’clock news represented the sanitized news that was typically aired 
during pre-2011 Myanmar, while the tea shop provided a 
“quintessential…place to learn…what the 8 o’clock news was not [then] 
discussing.”95 Combining these two metaphors, Facebook served as the 
place where both “military leaders and activists share the same virtual 
space, and where there is no direct way for state authorities to control 
or censor dissenting voices.”96 Myanmar’s socio-political context thus 
magnifies the importance of platforms, similar to other Global South 
contexts such as Kenya.97 Despite military ownership of media 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-censorship-
idUSBRE87J06N20120820. 
90. See Christopher Zara, Jailed For A Facebook Poem: The Fight Against 
Myanmar’s Draconian Defamation Laws, FASTCOMPANY (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40438242/jailed-for-a-facebook-poem-
the-fight-against-myanmars-draconian-defamation-laws. 
91. Defamation is currently penalized under six different laws, some of which 
allow criminal complaints to be filed by persons other than the person 
allegedly defamed. For an overview, see Gayathry Venkiteswaran, Yin 
Yadanar Thein & Myint Kyaw, Legal Changes for Media and Expression: 
New Reforms, Old Controls, in MYANMAR MEDIA IN TRANSITION: 
LEGACIES, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE 59 (Lisa Brooten, Jane Madlyn 
McElhone & Gayathry Venkiteswaran eds., 2019). 
92. See Myanmar Profile - Media, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12991727. 
93. Michelle J. Foster, The Business Environment for News Media in 
Myanmar: 2018, INTERNEWS (2018), 
https://internews.org/resource/business-environment-news-media-
myanmar-2018. 
94. Yan Naung Oak and Lisa Brooten, The Tea Shop Meets the 8 O’clock 
News: Facebook, Coveregence and Online Public Spaces, MYANMAR 
MEDIA IN TRANSITION: LEGACIES, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE 325, 329 (Lisa 
Brooten, Jane Madlyn McElhone, Gayathry Venkiteswaran, eds., 2019). 
95. Id. at 328.  
96. Id. at 329.  
97. NANJALA NYABOLA, DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, ANALOGUE POLITICS: HOW THE 
INTERNET IS TRANSFORMING THE POLITICS IN KENYA 204-205 (2018) 
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conglomerates,98 government officials exploit the populist appeal of the 
platform to its advantage, humanizing authority figures to the level of 
the ordinary citizen and average Facebook user. This gives the illusion 
of equality between state officials and ordinary citizens, reinforcing the 
narrative of democracy. For Jack Balkin, “digital technologies highlight 
the culture and participatory features of freedom of expression.”99 In 
Myanmar, platforms appear not only to “highlight” these features 
insomuch as help bring about a participatory culture in a country in the 
midst of democratic transition. This conforms to Facebook’s expressed 
commitment to promote “voice,”100 where both state and citizen are 
Facebook users equally subject to the platform’s rules. This would have 
an important implication later on, when Facebook banned Myanmar’s 
commander-in-chief from the platform.101  
Kate Klonick described platforms as the “new governors,”102 where 
private rules regulate individual expression alongside speech laws. This 
reinforces Duncan Kennedy’s position of the collapse of the public-
private distinction, where binaries merely feed into each other in a 
referential “loop.”103 Kennedy argues that, “[a]lthough these [public and 
private] distinctions are not synonymous, they are all in a sense ‘the 
 
(describing the importance of platforms in Kenya to coordinate public 
action). 
98. Oliver Spencer & Yin Yadanar Thein, Has Facebook Censored Myanmar’s 
Commander-in-chief?, FRONTIER MYANMAR (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/has-facebook-censored-myanmars-
commander-in-chief (arguing that the Myanmar military’s highest ranked 
officer cannot be censored as the military “owns several television stations 
and newspapers,” and therefore still has the opportunity for expression). 
99. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2004). 
100. Monica Bickert, Updating the Values that Inform Our Community 
Standards, FACEBOOK (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that-
inform-our-community-standards/; Facebook also describes its mission as 
giving people “the power to build community and bring the world closer 
together… to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s 
going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them.” 
Our Mission, Fᴀᴄᴇʙᴏᴏᴋ, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last 
visited March 25, 2020) 
101. Antoni Slodkowski, Facebook Bans Myanmar Army Chief, Others in 
Unprecedented Move, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-facebook/facebook-bans-
myanmar-army-chief-others-in-unprecedented-move-idUSKCN1LC0R7. 
102. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018). 
103. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1982).  
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same…’ [I]t is hard to define any one of them without reference to all.”104 
Facebook’s speech regulation demonstrates this “loopification.” Its 
system of governance mimics constitutional structures. The 
Community Standards function as law, content moderators enforce the 
law, and the Facebook Oversight Board will interpret the law as a 
“supreme court”105 charged with deciding challenging content.106  
Importantly, Facebook’s ban of the Tatmadaw commander-in-chief 
from the platform brings to its fullest expression platforms’ state-like 
power. In a regulatory paradox,107 the traditional roles of regulator 
(state) and regulated corporate entity (non-state) are reversed. In this 
light, platforms not only regulate individual expression, and trigger the 
threat of collateral censorship,108 they also regulate state speech. The 
irony is not lost in a country where the military imposed decades of 
heavy censorship on its citizens. This seems to be another distinction 
 
104. Id. at 1349.  
105. Hanna Kozlowska, Facebook Will Have a Supreme Court-like Body Within 
a Year, QUARTZ (Nov. 16, 2018), https://qz.com/1465898/mark-
zuckerberg-facebook-to-have-a-supreme-court-within-a-year/. But see 
Symposium, Platform Society: Copyright, Free Speech, and Sharing on 
Social Media Platforms, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 
1, 12–14 (2019), video available at 
http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2019/10/10/the-27th-annual-iplj-
symposium-platform-society-copyright-free-speech-and-sharing-on-social-
media-platforms-friday-october-4-2019/ (disagreeing on the 
characterization of the Oversight Board as a “supreme court” under the 
current institutional design because the Board, in addition to deciding 
cases on appeal, has the power to issue advisory opinions that will shape 
Facebook’s content policy); OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.oversightboard.com (last visited May 17, 2020). 
106. See Nick Clegg, Welcoming the Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (May 6, 
2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/welcoming-the-oversight-
board/; Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an 
Independent Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversight-board-structure/; A 
Conversation with Mark Zuckerberg, Noah Feldman, and Jenny Martinez, 
FACEBOOK (June 27, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/06/mark-challenge-jenny-martinez-
noah-feldman/.  
107. Removing Myanmar Military Officials from Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 
28, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-
officials/; Antoni Slodkowski, Facebook Bans Myanmar Army Chief, 
Others in Unprecedented Move, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-facebook/facebook-bans-
myanmar-army-chief-others-in-unprecedented-move-idUSKCN1LC0R7. 
108. See generally Klonick, supra note 103; Jack Balkin, Free Speech is a 
Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2016-17 (2018); Jack Balkin, Old-
School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298 
(2014).  
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between Global South and Global North contexts.109 Leaving aside the 
realpolitik that likely moved platforms to regulate (or not regulate) the 
speech of state actors as platform users, the implications on corporate 
responsibility are still worthy of examination. Whereas corporate 
accountability was originally envisioned to regulate corporate 
interference with the exercise of individual human rights,110 Facebook’s 
ban of a state actor’s speech shows a corporation taking on the task to 
regulate state action, including in fulfilling the latter’s duty to protect 
human rights. 
One important question with respect to regulating social media that 
fosters atrocity crimes is how international law should apply to the 
work of platforms. Relatedly, the FFM recommended that Facebook 
and similar companies “apply international human rights law as basis 
for content moderation.”111  This suggestion echoes the stand of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, non-governmental 
organizations, and commentators on the subject.112 Some portions of 
 
109. Interestingly, Twitter banned Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s account 
after it mourned the death of Iranian Major General Qassim Soleimani 
due to a targeted US drone strike. Twitter also temporarily suspended or 
restricted the accounts of the supreme leader of Iran and leader of 
Venezuela’s national assembly. See Ben Norton, Under US Pressure, 
Social Media Companies Censor Critical Content and Suspend 
Venezuelan, Iranian, and Syrian Accounts, THE GRAYZONE, (Jan. 12, 
2020), https://thegrayzone.com/2020/01/12/us-pressure-social-media-
censoring-suspending-venezuela-iran-syria/. Instagram similarly removed 
accounts expressing support for Soleimani, citing US sanctions against 
Iran as the basis. Casey Newton, Why Activists Get Frustrated with 
Facebook, THE VERGE (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/1/14/21063887/activists-
facebook-iran-free-speech-authoritarianism. In contrast, despite President 
Trump’s Twitter statements on “quickly and fully” striking back and 
“perhaps in a disproportionate manner” against Iran should it retaliate 
for the Soleimani killing, Twitter did not suspend Trump’s Twitter.  
110. See Corporations, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/corporate-accountability/ 
(last visited March 25, 2020).  
111. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1718. 
112. UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL A/74/486, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression (Oct. 9, 2019) (discussing the applicability of international 
human rights law to regulating online hate speech); UN HUMAN RIGHTS 
COUNCIL A/HRC/38/35, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression (April 6, 2018), at 15-16 (recommending that content 
moderation should adhere to the principles of legality, necessity and 
proportionality, and non-discrimination originally designed for states 
under the ICCPR); ARTICLE 19, Self-regulation and ‘hate speech’ on social 
media platforms (2018); Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of 
Expression Online, 17 Duke Law & Technology Review 26 (2018).  
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Facebook’s Community Standards are said to reflect legal norms. 
Klonick likened the protected categories of Facebook’s Hate Speech 
policy to those of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964.113 Moreover, the 
values that inform Facebook’s Community Standards now make 
reference to  “international human rights standards.”114 The question 
of normative alignment becomes more crucial in light of the 
establishment of Facebook’s Oversight Board.115 Perhaps a more 
important question in the context of mass atrocities is whether there 
exists a need to regulate and impose legal obligations on companies, or 
if self-regulation is enough. If regulation is necessary, should this be 
international or regional116 in form, or will domestic regulation suffice? 
In pursuing these questions, it is crucial to consider the current relevant 
regimes of international legal responsibility to know the conceptual 
limitations that can hinder our exploration. 
 
II. Gap 
In the report, the FFM concluded that the inciteful rhetoric on 
Facebook could amount to persecution as a crime against humanity or 
as advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence that must be 
 
113. Klonick, supra note 102, at 1645 n.327 (citing §§ 201–202, 703, “outlawing 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
114. Monica Bickert, Updating the Values that Inform our Community 
Standards, FACEBOOK (September 12, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that-
inform-our-community-standards/; Evelyn Douek, Why Facebook’s 
‘Values’ Update Matters, LAWFARE (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-facebooks-values-update-matters; 
However, Klonick maintains that the influence of American law cannot 
be overlooked, particularly because Facebook’s policymakers are steeped 
in American free speech norms. See Klonick, supra note 102, at 1621-22; 
Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures 
and Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 61 (2019). 
115. I suggested, for example, using the work of relevant human rights 
institutions such as the ICC as a signpost that can guide the Oversight 
Board’s case selection. See Jenny Domino, How Myanmar’s Incitement 
Landscape Can Inform Platform Regulation in Situations of Mass 
Atrocity, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 2, 2020), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/02/how-myanmars-incitement-landscape-
can-inform-platform-regulation-in-situations-of-mass-atrocity/.   
116. See, e.g., EU Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N (June 30, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-
conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en#theeucodeofconduct. 
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prohibited and punished.117 In this section, I will map out the relevant 
framework for prohibited speech under international law. First, I will 
briefly describe the content of prohibited speech, i.e., the different types 
of speech that may be restricted under international human rights law 
and punished under international criminal law. Second, I will delineate 
the legal responsibility of various actors, i.e., states and natural persons, 
for the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. In 
light of the FFM’s recommendation to investigate potential commission 
of genocide in Myanmar118 and the legal proceedings instituted by The 
Gambia at the ICJ concerning Myanmar’s alleged violation of the 
Genocide Convention,119 it is not farfetched to apply the legal 
framework for direct and public incitement to commit genocide to this 
issue. My discussion henceforth will be grounded by the applicable 
framework for this form of prohibited speech. Importantly, incitement 
to genocide has the clearest international legal framework with 
relatively the most developed judicial precedent.120 It thus presents the 
strongest framework for informing the corporate responsibility to 
“respect” human rights under the UNGPs. I will then examine the 
degree of guidance that corporations can glean from this framework. 
Finally, I will illustrate how the Facebook issue in Myanmar leaves 
open a gap for corporate responsibility for incitement to genocide caused 
by these fragmented lines of responsibility.  
A. Prohibited speech under international law 
1. International human rights law  
Limitations on speech must conform to the requirements of Article 
19(3) of the ICCPR on legality, necessity, and proportionality, i.e., the 
limitation must be contained in a validly enacted law; must be 
necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, such as (a) respecting the rights 
or reputations of others or (b) protecting national security, public order, 
or public health or morals; and the means used proportionate to 
securing that aim.121 Article 20 of the ICCPR prohibits two types of 
speech: 1) any propaganda for war and 2) any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence.” State parties to the ICCPR must regulate, not 
necessarily penalize, these forms of expression.122 Under the Rabat Plan 
of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious 
 
117. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1310, 1319 
118. Id. ¶¶ 1439-1441. 
119. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
120. See infra Part 2.  
121. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(3), Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
122. See id. 
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hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence, states must distinguish three forms of expression: those 
requiring penal sanction; those only justifying a civil or administrative 
sanction, but not prosecution; and finally, those not requiring any form 
of sanction at all, but nonetheless “raises concern in terms of tolerance, 
civility and respect for the rights of others.”123 The Rabat of Action 
recommends the adoption of both legal and policy measures to tackle 
the root causes of discriminatory speech.124  
Other treaties also prohibit certain forms of speech. The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination prohibits incitement to racial discrimination and 
incitement of violent acts against a certain race or group of persons of 
another color or ethnic origin.125 The Genocide Convention prohibits 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Under Article III(c), 
incitement to genocide is a crime.126 
2. International criminal law 
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) incorporated the crime of incitement to genocide 
under the Genocide Convention as one of their punishable acts.127 The 
Rome Statute similarly transplanted this crime in the text, but 
converted incitement to genocide from a crime to a mode of committing 
genocide under Article 25(3)(e).128 
 
123. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Expert Workshops on the 
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, ¶ 20, 
U.N.Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 (Jan. 11, 2013). 
124. Id. ¶¶ 21–26.  
125. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
126. Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. III(c).  
127. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2(3)(c), 
Nov. 8, 1994; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia art. 4(3)(c), May 25, 1993. 
128. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25(3)(e). See RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, 
INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL SPEECH CRIMES 33 
(2017) (explaining that the “odd placement” of incitement to genocide 
under Art. 25 of the Rome Statute as a mode of criminal liability rather 
than a crime under Art. 6 was likely a result of inadvertence); GREGORY 
GORDON, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION, FRAGMENTATION, 
FRUITION 385 (2017) ((arguing that this demotion is an “optical 
perception”); Thomas E. Davies, How the Rome Statute Weakens the 
Internal Prohibition on Incitement to Genocide, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
245, 245-46 (2009); Wibke Kristin Timmerman, Incitement in 
International Criminal Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 823, 825 (2006). 
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As for incitement of other Rome Statute crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity, there is no equivalent crime. Under the Rome 
Statute, speakers can be prosecuted for speech as a form of contributory 
liability to the main crimes against humanity charge.129 In the ICC’s 
Ruto and Sang case, for instance, Sang was charged for contributing to 
the commission of crimes against humanity instead of being charged for 
a crime of incitement to commit crimes against humanity.130 In the 
ICTY and ICTR, hate speech was prosecuted as a constitutive act of 
persecution in conjunction with other persecutory acts, but to date it 
is not settled whether hate speech by itself can constitute persecution. 
131 In the ICTR’s Nahimana case, Judge Theodor Meron registered a 
strong dissent to the inclusion of hate speech as one of the bases for 
Nahimana’s conviction.132  Citing US cases such as Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, Judge Meron opined that “every idea is an incitement”133 and 
statements short of “direct threat of violence or an incitement to 
commit imminent lawless action” are not criminal”.134 If anything, these 
disagreements signal the rugged terrain of speech prosecution under 
international law.135 
B. Legal responsibility for direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide 
1. State responsibility 
The Genocide Convention clearly defined the role of state and 
natural person in regulating genocide – states have a duty to prevent 
 
129. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25(3)(d). 
130. The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-
01/09-01/11, Majority Opinion (April 5, 2016) [hereinafter Ruto and 
Sang].  
131. See Richard Ashby Wilson & Matthew Gillet, The Hartford Guidelines 
on Speech Crimes in International Criminal Law, HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTE 48–60. 
132. The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and 
Hassan Ngeze, ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003) 
133. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v. The 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Meron ¶ 16 (Nov. 28, 2007) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
134. Id. ¶ 4. See also Jenny Domino, Market Failure? Re-examining the 
Metaphor of the Marketplace of Ideas in the Philippines, STRATBASE ADR 
INSTITUTE (2019), https://adrinstitute.org/2019/06/04/adri-occasional-
paper-market-failure-re-examining-the-metaphor-of-the-marketplace-of-
ideas-in-the-philippines/ (noting the global influence of the metaphor of 
the marketplace of ideas, including in incitement jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts). 
135. See INCITEMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 128. 
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and punish, while individuals are to be prosecuted. 136  In particular, 
state parties to the treaty have the duty to enact necessary legislation 
that would “give effect” to the provisions of the treaty and to “provide 
effective penalties” for any of the punishable acts enumerated.137 
National laws criminalizing incitement to genocide are consistent with 
Article 20 of the ICCPR on allowable limitations on the right to 
freedom of expression.138 Penalizing incitement to genocide is an 
allowable limitation as long as it meets Article 19(3) requirements of 
being validly enacted, necessary to protect a legitimate aim, and the 
limitation proportionate to achieve that aim.139 
2. Individual (criminal) responsibility 
Just as the Genocide Convention imposes a legal obligation on 
states, it provides under Article IV that natural persons committing 
any of the acts under Article III shall be punished, “whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals.”140 Such persons must be tried “by a competent tribunal of 
the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to 
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”141  
Under the treaty, the crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide has two distinct elements. First, language must be 
“direct.”142 In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held that the 
speech must assume “a direct form and specifically provoke another to 
engage in a criminal act, and that more than mere vague or indirect 
suggestion goes to constitute direct incitement.”143 This contemplated 
literal and figurative speech. For instance, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, and Prosecutor v. 
Niyitegeka all revolved around how the “work” metaphor was deployed 
in various statements. 144  
 
136. Philippa Webb, Binocular Vision: State Responsibility and Individual 
Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, in THE DIVERSIFICATION AND 
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 148 (Van den Herik 
& Stahn eds., 2012) (discussing international law’s two regimes of 
responsibility for genocide). 
137. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. V.  
138. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 121, art. 
20.  
139. Id. art. 19(3). 
140. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. IV.  
141. Id. art. VI. 
142. Id. art. III(c). 
143. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 557 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
144. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 44(iv) 
(June 1, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement and 
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The second element of the crime is that communication must be 
“public.”145 This generally contemplates “speeches, shouting or threats 
uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or 
dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material or printed 
matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through the public 
display of placards or posters, or through any other means of 
audiovisual communication.”146 The speaker need not speak in large 
public assemblies to qualify the communication as “public.” It is 
sufficient if statements are communicated to “smaller audiences,” so 
long as these were made in a public space to an “unselected audience.”147 
This interpretation is supported by the travaux préparatoire of the 
Genocide Convention, from which the crime of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide in the ICTR and ICTY Statutes was 
lifted.148 “Private” incitement is not penalized.149  
These elements are important to keep in mind for my later 
discussion on how crime can operate as a cognitive constraint in 
understanding corporate involvement in mass atrocity crimes. For now, 
I will proceed to discuss the corporate responsibility framework under 
the UNGPs and its implications for social media platforms operating in 
mass atrocity contexts. 
C. Corporate responsibility  
The UNGPs do not impose on corporations any legal obligation and 
do not result in legal liabilities.150 Instead, the corporate “responsibility” 
 
Sentence, ¶¶ 491, 493, 531, 676, 823, 856, 897 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor 
v. Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 257 (May 16, 
2003). 
145. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. III(c). 
146. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 559 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
147. Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor, ICTR-05-88-A, Judgment (Oct. 20, 2010). 
148. Id. ¶ 158 (referring to “public speeches or in the press, through the radio, 
the cinema or other ways of reaching the public”).  
149. Private incitement can be prosecuted as instigation, but not direct and 
public incitement as an inchoate crime. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR 96-
4-A, Judgement, ¶ 480 (June 1, 2001). 
150. The mandate of the UN Special Representative of the secretary-general 
on human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises was, among others, “to identify and clarify standards of 
corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with regard to human rights,” and did not 
include the drafting of a legally binding instrument that would impose 
legal obligations on states and corporations. Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, UN OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. 
RTS. 
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to respect human rights is based on the “basic expectation society has 
of business in relation to human rights.”151 The lack of legal obligation 
on corporations under international law can be traced to the state-
centric design of the international legal system,152 where only states are 
considered subjects capable of fulfilling legal obligation. This 
assessment of international law, however, has been criticized. Rosalyn 
Higgins, for one, described this phenomenon as “an intellectual prison 
of our own choosing.” She instead referred to corporations as 
“participants.”153 Andrew Clapham, on the other hand, preferred to 
imbue corporations with “limited international legal personality.”154  
In the beginning of his mandate, John Ruggie noted the failure of 
the draft 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human 
Rights (“draft 2003 Norms”).155 The draft 2003 Norms would have, if 
adopted, directly obligated transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises to come up with “internal rules of operation”156 
that would implement the following rights in their business: right to 
security of persons, workers’ rights, equal opportunity and non-
discriminatory treatment, respect for national sovereignty and human 
rights, environmental protection, and consumer protection.157 The 
 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpInd
ex.aspx (last visited March 25, 2020). 
151. JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 90–94 (2013) (narrating how Shell lost its “social license” 
with the Ogoni tribe in Nigeria to make the point that social norms “exist 
over and above compliance with laws and regulations”) [hereinafter JUST 
BUSINESS].  
152. See Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for 
International Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring 
Challenges, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 223, 226 (2008). 
153. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 49 (1994). 
154. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
238, at 279 (2006). 
155. UN Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights (Aug. 26, 2003) 
[hereinafter Draft 2003 Norms]. 
156. Id. ¶ 15.  
157. Id. ¶¶ 2–14; Paragraph 10 of the 2003 Norms arguable provides the best 
example: “Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall 
recognize and respect applicable norms of international law, national laws 
and regulations, as well as administrative practices, the rule of law, the 
public interest, development objectives, social, economic and cultural 
policies including transparency, accountability and prohibition of 
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message seemed simple enough – ignore the rights that did not apply 
(e.g. fair trial rights), and implement the ones that did. Ruggie 
concluded that this approach was not only without any “authoritative 
basis in international law – hard, soft, or otherwise,” it likewise did not 
articulate an “actual principle for differentiating human rights 
responsibilities based on the respective social roles performed by states 
and corporations.”158 Consequently, the draft 2003 Norms had the 
unintended effect of imposing on all transnational corporations binding 
standards culled from treaties that not all states have signed or 
ratified.159 This led to its demise, i.e. it was declared to have no legal 
standing.160 
Working within this contestation, Ruggie capitalized on companies’ 
“social license to operate” to regulate corporate behavior, using human 
rights law as a source of normative content rather than of legal 
obligation.161 Corporate responsibility to respect human rights means 
“that business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid 
infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with 
which they are involved.”162 For this purpose, the UNGPs serve as “a 
global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises 
wherever they operate.”163 They “elaborate the implications of existing 
standards and practices for States and businesses; integrating them 
within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive template.”164 
Principle 12 makes a direct reference to the International Bill of Human 
Rights, including the ICCPR, as being the human rights framework 
 
corruption, and authority of the countries in which the enterprises 
operate.” 
158. John Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶¶ 60, 66, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Ruggie 2006 Report]. 
159. Id. ¶ 66.  
160. U.N. Commission on Human Rights Report on the Sixtieth Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (2004) (affirming that the 2003 Norms “has no 
legal standing” and does not give rise to any “monitoring function” on 
the part of the UN). 
161. JUST BUSINESS, supra note 151, at 90-94; John Ruggie, Protect, Respect 
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 54, U.N. 
Doc A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
162. UNGPs, supra note 14, at 13 (principle 11).  
163. Id. (commentary to principle 11).  
164. UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/31, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie 
(Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Ruggie 2011 report]; UNGPs, supra note 15, 
at 13-14 (Principle 12).  
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from which to draw expected standards of corporate conduct.165 The 
UNGPs also refer to international criminal law. 166 Principle 13 cautions 
companies against involvement in gross human rights abuses through 
the conduct of human rights due diligence.167 It also articulates the 
different ways that corporations create a human rights impact – causing 
or contributing to the impact, or being linked to the impact through its 
product, operations or services. This applies to mass atrocity contexts, 
including Facebook’s involvement in the spread of incitement in 
Myanmar.  It explains why in the (belated) human rights impact 
assessment commissioned by Facebook in 2018, Business for Social 
Responsibility (BSR) concluded that with respect to hate speech and 
incitement to violence in Myanmar, Facebook is “directly linked to 
them via the actions of users on its platform that violate Facebook’s 
Community Standards.”168 The finding tracks the language of the 
UNGPs. 
In the context of incitement to genocide, there are two relevant 
regimes to guide platforms’ content moderation: international human 
rights law and international criminal law. Both the FFM as well as the 
UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression recommended the use 
of international human rights law as basis for content moderation 
policy.169 Facebook’s revised “preamble” to its Community Standards 
is a significant example of this application. In the words of Facebook: 
“Our commitment to giving people voice remains paramount. We also 
focus on authenticity, safety, privacy and dignity in writing and 
enforcing our Community Standards.”170 These competing values – 
particularly voice and safety – somewhat resemble the structure of 
 
165. UNGPs, supra note 14, at 13–14 (principle 12).  
166. Id. at 8–10 (principle 7); id. at 14–15 (principle 13).  
167. Id. at 14–15.  
168. Business for Social Responsibility, Human Rights Impact Assessment: 
Facebook in Myanmar, at 35 (2018), 
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/bsr-facebook-
myanmar-hria_final.pdf [hereinafter BSR Report]. Notably, the BSR 
report, which identified potential adverse human rights impacts in 
Myanmar, was commissioned after actual impacts had already occurred 
and only published after the FFM had released its report. 
169. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1718; UN Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/38/35 (April 6, 2018). 
170. Monika Bickert, Updating the Values that Inform our Community 
Standards, FACEBOOK (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that-inform-
our-community-standards/. 
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Article 19 and 20.171 Expression is generally allowed (“voice”; Article 
19) except when certain rights are at risk (“safety”; Article 20 
prohibited speech).172  
However, Facebook is silent as to how it intends to strike a balance 
between these competing values.173 The lack of definition of hate speech 
under international law, and its ambivalent treatment across 
jurisdictions and even within international criminal tribunals (e.g. 
Nahimana case), limit granular incorporation of human rights law in 
content moderation policy.174 There is no given set of words that 
exhaustively and conclusively amounts to allowable and prohibited 
content.175 The slippery nature of language, coupled with the differing 
contextual resonance of specific expressions, contribute to the challenge.  
At the very least, the usefulness of the ICCPR is in ensuring 
procedural guarantees in content moderation (e.g. transparency and 
oversight, due process).176 In the US, for instance, Danielle Keats Citron 
called for “technological due process,” likening platforms’ content 
moderation to the quasi-judicial function exercised by US 
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administrative agencies.177  The creation of Facebook’s Oversight Board 
also enriches the appeal process for content moderation decisions.178 
This was also described as an effort to provide and diversify public 
reasoning, and offer a veil of legitimacy for Facebook’s content 
moderation decisions.179 
The state-like behavior of platforms in moderating users’ speech 
has thus generated state-like protections for content restrictions. These 
initiatives constitute voluntary techniques for companies to adopt at 
will. The application of international human rights law so far has been 
internal to the business of content moderation. In contrast, 
conversations on legal regulation of platforms operating in mass 
atrocity contexts have yet to occur widely. Current regimes of legal 
liability for incitement to genocide are also unable to translate the role 
of platforms into existing modes of criminal participation, which I shall 
now discuss. 
III. Critique 
One popular approach to fill the gap in corporate accountability is 
to turn to criminal law. For Karen Engle, the “turn to criminal law” 
has catapulted crime to become the dominant mode for evaluating gross 
human rights violations.180 Human rights law presently situates the 
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fight for impunity front and center, going after perpetrators “with a 
vengeance.”181 This seems to be based on the “unstated assumption” 
that a move towards criminalization is a “clear success for the human 
rights movement.”182 Criminal prosecution has become the way by 
which to realize justice, and its expansion – with respect to 
perpetrators, constitutive acts, and territorial jurisdictions183 – remains 
the only question for its proponents. As Frédéric Mégret observes, even 
mainstream critiques of international criminal law are “constitutive” of 
the field, such that critiques are mainly aimed at expanding 
international criminal law’s “toolbox.”184 
The popularity of international criminal law coincides with the 
“paradigm shift” in international law from a state-centric legal order to 
one that places responsibility on natural persons.185 In this light, it 
resembles David Kennedy’s description of human rights discourse as 
hegemonic.186 According to David Kennedy, the language of human 
rights  has become the “dominant and fashionable vocabulary for 
thinking about emancipation” and “crowds out other ways of 
understanding harm recompense.”187 The repercussion of this is to 
“strengthen” the state apparatus by “structuring liberation as a 
 
15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002) [hereinafter International Human 
Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?].  
181. (Anti) Politics and Criminalization, supra note 180, at 58.  
182. Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law, supra note 180, at 1071; 
Self-Critique, supra note 180, at 57. Contra Theodor Meron, Human rights 
Law Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of International 
Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals, THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (appearing to suggest that 
international criminal law and human rights law complement each other); 
Christine E.J. Schwöbel, The Comfort of International Criminal Law, 24 
L. CRITIQUE 169, 171 (2013) (interpreting Meron’s description of the 
relationship between ICL and human rights law as complementing each 
other). 
183. See, e.g., International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber I, Request 
under Regulation Article 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Decision 
on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 
19(3) of the Statute”, No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18 (Sept. 6, 2018). 
184. Mégret, supra note 180 (observing that the critics of the field are also 
“deeply influenced by one’s position within it”); Schwöbel, supra note 182, 
at 24 (noting that ICL is expanded by the actors constituting and 
implementing it whether as a judge, practitioner, or academic). 
185. Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Cernic, Regulating Corporations 
under International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal 
Law and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 725, 740-741 (2010).  
186. See International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, supra 
note 180, at 108.  
187. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE 9–10 (2004). 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Crime as Cognitive Constraint 
175 
relationship between an individual right holder and the state.”188 This 
consequently “leaves unattended or enhanced the powers and felt 
entitlements of private actors.”189  
International criminal law is no different; it seeks a different goal 
through similar means. The dominant and fashionable vocabulary for 
thinking about justice now is to prosecute the persons most responsible. 
Mass atrocity crimes are attributed to a “few bad individual 
perpetrators, even monsters,”190 with the effect of obscuring structural 
causes, political contexts, and the “ideological content” of such 
crimes.191 In framing justice in terms of prosecution and individual 
agency, criminal law overemphasizes the role of individual actors and 
effectively decontextualizes the event. This has led to a description of 
international criminal law’s liberal features as reductionist.192 
Expanding the “toolbox” to include legal or juridical persons within 
the scope of the ICC’s personal jurisdiction conforms to this paradigm 
shift.193 Corporate criminal liability under international law feeds the 
behemoth. In this section, I will demonstrate how this can limit our 
thinking of harm and operate as a cognitive constraint in evaluating 
corporate involvement in mass atrocity contexts. 
A. Corporate criminal liability 
Corporate executives can be prosecuted under international 
criminal law. There is no contest here. The Nuremberg Tribunal, for 
instance, prosecuted the officers and directors of companies complicit 
in the Nazi regime.194 In the ICC’s Ruto and Sang case, Sang was a 
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corporate executive of the radio station, Kass FM, where he aired his 
vitriolic statements as a radio host.195 The controversy that remains 
pertains to the prosecution of the corporate entity. Currently, there is 
no consensus on corporate criminal liability under international law. 
This, along with the continuing massive influence of corporations 
globally,196 contribute to scholarly preoccupation on the topic. At the 
time of drafting of the Rome Statute, the proposal to prosecute 
corporations was rejected due to a lack of state practice, which would 
have the effect of undermining the principle of complementarity.197 
Caroline Kaeb argues that the landscape has changed since then.198 
More national jurisdictions presently recognize corporate criminal 
liability; no less than the Special Tribunal for Lebanon acknowledged 
in 2014 that legal persons are not exempt from international criminal 
prosecution.199 
David Scheffer offers two viable options in effecting the change on 
the international plane: either amend Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute, 
so that the ICC is expressly given jurisdiction to prosecute juridical 
persons, or negotiate an optional protocol to the Rome Statute that 
would allow the prosecution of corporations, subject to the same process 
that an Article 25(1) amendment would entail.200 Despite the elaborate 
and politically challenging exercise of treaty negotiations, some aver 
that the benefit of an amendment is not in seeing more corporations 
prosecuted before the ICC (whose limited resources and strict 
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admissibility thresholds might be hard to overcome).201 Rather, the 
advantage of such an amendment lies in its normative potential.202 It 
could form authoritative basis to push for criminal prosecution of 
corporations in national courts, obviating the lengthy norm-making 
process required by customary international law.203 Ironically, such 
purpose recalls the lack of state practice and clear customary norm 
expressed during the Rome Statute negotiations as basis for excluding 
corporate criminal liability in the Rome Statute.  
The new draft of the Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in 
International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (“draft BHR treaty”) 
similarly attempts to crystallize criminal prosecution of corporations for 
serious international crimes, but domestically. Articles 6 and 7(a) 
require states to enable domestic prosecution of corporations – without 
prejudice to the domestic prosecution of individuals – for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute.204 Importantly, it avoids the 
approach of the draft 2003 Norms by putting back the onus on states 
to regulate businesses domiciled within their territory.205 Unlike the 
proposal to amend the Rome Statute to prosecute juridical persons,206 
the draft BHR treaty formally relies on national systems to criminalize 
and punish, not on an international mechanism.207  
Corporate criminal liability has been viewed as a necessary step to 
close the accountability gap.208 To be fair, Article 6(7) of the draft BHR 
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treaty also obligates the state to impose civil and administrative 
sanctions against corporations.209 However, the addition of a penal 
sanction has arguably generated more celebration, as it would, for one, 
solve the “persistent ambiguity” surrounding corporate criminal 
liability.210 It is worth emphasizing that efforts towards prosecuting 
corporations internationally or domestically for serious international 
crimes share a similar objective – to expand the coverage of crime. The 
stories thus far have been one of accommodation: if criminal law does 
not cover corporations, then make it so. It reflects the assumption that 
criminal law should be the lens through which harm must be 
appreciated. The only question that remains is how to adjust the rules 
of the game.  
B. Crime as cognitive constraint: Facebook as a “useful instrument” 
for hate speech in Myanmar 
The Facebook issue in Myanmar demonstrates how international 
criminal law provides no cognitive frame for comprehending the split 
between speaker and non-state curators of speech in instances of 
incitement to genocide posted online. Responsibility is rendered more 
difficult to articulate because platform involvement is unhinged from 
the laws of territoriality and physicality. In the BSR report, Facebook 
was found to be “directly linked” to such speech, using the language of 
the UNGPs, but the concept of “direct link” is not conceptually 
available in the language of crime.211 The language of crime thus leaves 
out other possible actors beyond the speaker. It also potentially hinders 
tinkering with other remedies. 
Traditional cases of corporate entanglement in gross human rights 
violations required a knowing act or omission on the part of a corporate 
agent. This was apparent in the prosecution of corporate officers before 
the Nuremberg Tribunal for using slave labor and supplying weapons 
to exterminate the Jews.212 In its legal conception, complicity is 
understood as aiding and abetting.213 Complicity generally required 
 
209. Lopez, supra note 204. 
210. Nadia Bernaz, Including Corporate Criminal Liability for International 
Crimes in the Business and Human Rights Treaty: Necessary but 
Insufficient, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/including-corporate-criminal-liability-for-
international-crimes-in-the-business-and-human-rights-treaty-necessary-
but-insufficient [https://perma.cc/HR23-RG6V] (last visited Feb. 5, 
2020); See also Davoise, supra note 201. 
211. BSR Report, supra note 168, at 35.  
212. See Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigent, Corporate Responsibility Before 
International Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1036-37 
(2009).  
213. What is Complicity or Accomplice Liability?, FINDLAW, 
https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/what-is-complicity-or-
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Crime as Cognitive Constraint 
179 
knowingly providing practical assistance or encouragement that has a 
substantial effect on the commission of a crime.214 The finding of guilt 
depended on whether the accused possessed actual or constructive 
knowledge based on the circumstances.215 The implication of this for 
corporate criminal liability is to adopt a mode of determining 
culpability for corporate entities, which inherently act through natural 
persons. There are different models for conceptualizing corporate 
behavior to be repurposed for prosecution.216 Michael J. Kelly, for 
instance, adheres to the view of attributing the acts and knowledge of 
the corporate officer to the corporate entity.217 As applied to the I.G. 
Farben case, this would make use of a “complicity standard of 
knowledge to impute parts of what each individual defendant knew to 
a unified whole on the part of the company.”218 This can be traced 
through “corporate minutes, transactional records, and aggressive 
cross-examination.”219 
Recall that in the previous section I discussed the two distinct 
elements of incitement – that communication must be direct and public. 
These elements reveal that the crime of incitement places the onus of 
liability on the individual speaker. There is no distinction between 
publishers and broadcasters from a criminal lens; all content producers 
are considered inciters. Julius Streicher was convicted at the Nuremberg 
Tribunal of crimes against humanity220 for publishing speeches and 
articles that actively called for the annihilation of Jews, portraying 
them as a group deserving to be “exterminated root and branch.”221 In 
 
accomplice-liability.html [https://perma.cc/FC48-SMTN] (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2020). 
214. CORPORATE COMPLICITY REPORT, supra note 195, at 17, 21–22. But see 
Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 25(3)(c) (appearing to heighten the 
standard by requiring that the aider or abettor possess the “purpose of 
facilitating the commission of the crime”). 
215. Oona A. Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal 
Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1614 (2019).  
216. See Kaeb, supra note 196, at 384-85; Carsten Stahn, supra note 192, at 
96-97. 
217. Michael J. Kelly, Atrocities by Corporate Actors: A Historical 
Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 49, 76-77 (2018).  
218. Id. at 76. 
219. Id. 
220. See Julius Streicher, TRIAL 
INTERNATIONAL, https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/julius-
streicher/ [https://perma.cc/3RTV-EXNW] (ast visited Feb. 6, 2020). At 
that time, there was no crime of incitement to genocide under 
international law. 
221. International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War 
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 
November 1945 – 1 October 1946 Vol. 1, at 302-303 (1947), 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Crime as Cognitive Constraint 
180 
the ICTR, the Media Trial defendants – Barayagwiza, Nahimana, and 
Ngeze –  were prosecuted in their respective capacity as executive 
committee chairman of Radio Television Libres des Milles Collines, as 
broadcaster, and as Kangura’s newspaper editor.222 In the ICC case, 
Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, Joseph Arap Sang, a radio broadcaster, 
was charged of contributing to the commission of crimes against 
humanity based on the following acts, among others: 
placing his show Lee Nee Emet at the disposal of [Ruto’s] 
organization, advertising the meetings of the organization, 
fanning the violence through the spread of hate messages 
explicitly revealing desire to expel the Kikuyus, broadcasting false 
news regarding alleged murders of Kalenjin people in order to 
inflame the atmosphere in the days preceding the elections; and 
broadcasting instructions during the attacks in order to direct the 
physical perpetrators to the areas designated as targets.223 
In all these acts, the agency of the speaker is crystal clear. In the 
analog era, speakers own and control the technology to be used at their 
disposal in committing the crime. This meant that incitement need only 
be spoken in order to be publicly communicated. By controlling who 
had access to communication, only a singular message prevailed, 
enabling passive reception of inciteful propaganda. The ‘public’ element 
of the crime was satisfied due to publishers and broadcasters’ control 
of the platform. This also explains why incitement to genocide has been 
described as “state-sponsored speech.”224 In the analog era, the state 
was in the best position to co-opt radios and newspapers to deliver its 
message. It does not contemplate a situation where the technology is 
within the control of a third party removed from the speaker and the 
criminal statement. 
Enter Facebook. In the platform era, private speech intermediaries 
have wrested control from the state. The inciter and speech 
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infrastructure owner are split between two actors. State and citizen are 
both reduced to platform users, and the intermediary curates the 
message imparted and received. Curation is facilitated by organizing 
user content to be made more visible to other users,225 in line with the 
platform’s Community Standards and deployed through algorithmic 
design. Thus, on top of being spoken, incitement is also necessarily 
coded by a third party in order to be publicly communicated. Such 
third party is distanced from the content producer physically but also 
mentally, thus negating knowledge and purpose of the criminal design. 
This distinguishes platforms from traditional media (journalist, 
broadcaster, publisher): platforms are not privy to the production of 
content and do not claim it as their own. In contrast, a journalist who 
writes an article and the publisher who decides to run it both exercise 
ownership over the act of communication.   
Well-aware of the challenges of prosecuting social media platforms 
as publishers and broadcasters for incitement to genocide, Shannon Raj 
Singh alternatively proposes to extend aiding and abetting liability to 
social media platforms by comparing them to weapons suppliers.226 
Citing cases from the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and 
the Zyklon B poison gas case (collectively, “ad hoc tribunals”), Singh 
argues that complicity is “well-suited” because there is no need for 
intent to commit the crime, only “knowledge of the end use of [the 
company’s] products.”227   
A significant constraint of this thesis is its reliance on the 
assumption that the mens rea for aiding and abetting only requires 
knowledge, which was adopted in the ad hoc tribunals but not at the 
ICC.228 As Singh admits, aiding and abetting liability under Article 
25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute requires a stricter standard – “purpose” 
to facilitate the commission of the crime, rather than mere knowledge 
that the act will assist in its commission.229 However, there was no 
discussion of how the Rome Statute framework would alter her analysis. 
Although using Myanmar’s incitement landscape as a case study, Singh 
did not conclude that, based on her theory, Facebook can be prosecuted 
for its role in Myanmar’s incitement landscape.230 Rather, she used the 
Facebook dilemma to argue that aiding and abetting liability can be 
useful “for future scenarios.”231 
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The applicability of Singh’s argument under the Rome Statute 
framework is therefore uncertain. I argue that in the case of Facebook 
in Myanmar, the “knowledge” and “purpose” requirements are not met. 
Facebook’s cross-border involvement requires neither physical presence 
in a host State that characterized the usual examples of corporate 
complicity nor a knowing act or omission on the part of the corporate 
officer, which could be used as basis to prosecute the corporate officer 
as an individual or could be used to impute knowledge to the corporate 
entity. Although physical proximity is not required, it is nonetheless a 
good indication of knowledge and purpose. In Facebook’s case, 
intermediary involvement is characterized by product policy and 
algorithmic design. As I showed in Part 1, Facebook was largely ill-
equipped to understand, much less, review, Myanmar content during 
the relevant period. The platform was thus distanced from the inciter’s 
criminal utterance both ex-ante and ex-post. In contrast to corporate 
officers privy to the supply of weapons to persons most responsible for 
acts of genocide, there is no privity, much less purpose, in the case of 
the Facebook product policy manager in charge of tweaking the 
Community Standards, the human content moderator tasked to review 
and moderate content, the engineer feeding data into Facebook’s 
algorithms, or even Zuckerberg as controlling stockholder himself.  
This is not to say that social media platforms – or their owners or 
agents – will never possess the knowledge or purpose necessary for 
prosecution. There can be instances where the facts may satisfy both.232 
In this regard, Singh’s creative suggestion to establish an independent 
alert mechanism to at least help expose corporate “knowledge” is well-
taken.233 Nonetheless, my intention is to show how criminal law is not 
always an adequate cognitive frame in conceptualizing corporate 
involvement in mass atrocity crimes. As Facebook’s role in Myanmar 
has shown, there are various modalities of corporate harm in mass 
atrocity contexts that fall through the cracks, but the fixation on 
perceiving harm through the lens of crime hinders other conceptual 
approaches. My aim here is not to displace the international criminal 
law regime altogether, but to question its place on the pedestal and 
advocate for a broader network of international liabilities that can be 
concurrently or alternatively pursued. 
 
232. See, e.g., 2020 International Criminal Court Moot Court Competition 
Problem, International Criminal Court Moot Court Competition, 
http://iccmoot.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ICCMCC-2020-
Problem-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZD5-H4UB] (having as one of its 
main questions whether, on the basis of the specific facts of the 
hypothetical, the Defendant meets the purpose requirement under Article 
25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute).  
233. See Singh, supra note 227, at 340–42 (proposing an independent alert 
mechanism that will have “notification,” “connective,” and 
“accountability” functions). 
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The point remains that the FFM found that Facebook had a crucial 
role to play.234 Facebook as a company did ignore Myanmar civil 
society’s calls to pay more attention to the prevalence of hate speech 
on the platform in the years preceding the 2016 and 2017 outbreaks of 
violence. Facebook commissioned a human rights impact assessment 
only in 2018, years after market entry and after it had wreaked havoc 
in the country. It was only in 2018 when Myanmar-specific 
improvements noticeably surfaced on the platform, including hiring 
more Myanmar-fluent human content reviewers and forming a 
Myanmar team.235 No early warning signs or emergency escalation 
mechanisms appear to have been set up early on, as Myanmar civil 
society lamented.236 Facebook’s content moderation pre-2018 revealed 
a poor understanding of the socio-political context of Myanmar, 
particularly the state’s longstanding persecution of ethnic minorities.237 
These circumstances show that corporations may be involved in mass 
atrocity crimes in different ways, and criminal law may not always have 
the words for all modalities of corporate transgression.  
IV. The Promise of Tort 
The usefulness of tort to accommodate new modalities of harm, 
especially as a response to technology, is not new. In their seminal 
article arguing for a right to privacy, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis justified the development of a right to privacy as an actionable 
tort under US law due to intrusions into personal space facilitated by 
technology.238 In a similar manner, as technology refines corporate 
involvement in mass atrocity crimes, this article aims to develop a tort 
 
234. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1347. 
235. See Sara Su, Update on Myanmar, FACEBOOK (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/update-on-myanmar/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z7SW-KEQJ]; Removing Myanmar Military Officials 
from Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/ 
[https://perma.cc/4VQZ-UQCD]; Product Policy Forum Minutes, 
FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/content-standards-forum-
minutes/ [https://perma.cc/4CZG-MR36]. 
236. See Euan McKirdy, Facebook: We Didn’t Do Enough to Prevent 
Myanmar Violence, CNN BUSINESS (Nov. 6, 2018 11:49 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/06/tech/facebook-myanmar-
report/index.html [https://perma.cc/K27C-J8MN]. 
237. See Julia Carrie Wong, ‘Overreacting to Failure’: Facebook’s New 
Myanmar Strategy Baffles Local Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/07/facebook-
myanmar-genocide-violence-hate-speech [https://perma.cc/MM62-JHL2]. 
238. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
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to conceptualize various modalities of involvement. The proposal here 
neither seeks to solve all business and human rights issues nor abandons 
criminal law mechanisms, which are properly meant to try individuals 
– and perhaps, in appropriate cases in the future, corporate entities – 
responsible for serious international crimes. Instead, the object of this 
article is to highlight how certain cases of corporate involvement in 
mass atrocity crimes may not fit traditional models, which appear to 
justify a broader network of international liabilities. For that purpose, 
this section invites further thinking on how to harness tort principles 
for different manifestations of corporate harm. 
The tort liability set out here can potentially be brought before 
Maya Steinitz’s proposed International Court of Civil Justice, an 
international court that would adjudicate cross-border mass tort 
involving the most serious harms.239 In justifying its creation, Steinitz 
discussed the “flawed” transnational mass tort resolution in Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS)-type litigation, especially national courts’ reluctance to 
exercise jurisdiction over foreign-cubed cases.240 Beth Stephens similarly 
argues that the “need to invoke international law to address ‘domestic’ 
violence implies a breakdown of domestic legal remedies.”241 
Nonetheless, Steinitz is clear-eyed about the aim of an ICCJ. It does 
not offer a “perfect solution;” rather, its creation should be justified by 
“whether it would present a significant progress over existing reality.”242 
The tort proposal outlined here shares this objective— to carve out a 
corporate liability that can close the gap in legal responsibility under 
international law and accommodate different manifestations of 
corporate harm in mass atrocities. This section builds on Steinitz’s work 
by elaborating on the kinds of cases cognizable by the ICCJ.  
Significantly, my reference to tort here does not necessarily call for 
an international version of the ATS. Rather, the point of this exercise 
is to open up the conceptual analogies offered by tort law. The proposed 
liability contemplates corporate involvement in acts constituting Rome 
Statute crimes, but where types of liability are structured around tort 
law. Despite the variance in approach across jurisdictions, the essence 
of tort law is the same: to provide recompense for a negligent or 
 
239. See The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, supra note 26, 
at 75. 
240. Foreign-cubed cases involve a case where the plaintiff, defendant 
corporation, and the alleged injury occurred in a foreign jurisdiction. 
MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL 
JUSTICE 95 (Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
241. Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence under International Law: Do 
Tort Remedies Fit the Crime, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 593, 605 (1997) 
(describing how criminal law and tort law regimes can “complement” each 
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intentional conduct that causes harm to someone else. 243 How such an 
international tort liability should be conceived in full detail, however, 
is beyond the scope of this article and deserves further study. 
A. Rationale  
In examining the wisdom of corporate criminal liability generally, 
V.S. Khanna argues that corporate criminal liability is “socially 
desirable when substantially all of its traits are socially desirable.”244 
But only if some are, exploring other corporate liability regimes merit 
further consideration. For Carsten Stahn, the “benefits of criminal 
responsibility over civil liability for human rights accountability are not 
always fully clear.”245 This is because corporations are rarely the 
“masterminds of international crimes, but rather benefit from a given 
situation.” 246 Thus, the idea of corporate international criminal liability 
should not be “romanticized.”247  
The appeal of tort law lies in its ability to accommodate broad 
categories of conduct. Tort’s flexible features enable conceptualization 
of different modalities of behavior, including wrongs committed in the 
context of an armed conflict.248 Nominate torts address specific harms 
(e.g. defamation, trespass) whereas the more elastic tort of negligence 
possesses the general capacity to “recognize new wrongs, and new rights 
(or interests).”249 Importantly, “[r]egulation is inherent in tort law.” 250 
 
243. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 3 CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 
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CRIMES 10 (2008), https://www.icj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.3-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-
report-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/D28Y-AUL4]. 
244. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532 (1996).  
245. Stahn, supra note 192, at 124. 
246. Id. at 122.  
247. Id. at 124. 
248. See, e.g., Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 665, 687 
(2006) (arguing that “there is no reason why, at least in theory, a new 
tort should not be created for [] violations [of international humanitarian 
law]”). 
249. Jonathan Morgan, Torts and Technology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW, REGULATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 522-23 (Roger Brownsword, Eloise 
Scotford & Karen Yeung eds., 2017).  
250. Id. at 523. Although Ratner argues against domestic tort law due to its 
divergence across jurisdictions, this may be avoided precisely by 
negotiating a treaty that would settle these differences. See Steven 
Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443, 543 (2001). 
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Tort’s regulatory function can resolve competing interests. In the BSR 
report, for instance, one interviewee noted that there was generally 
nothing wrong with Facebook’s Community Standards, the only 
problem was its poor implementation.251 In the words of another 
interviewee: “We are not in the delete-Facebook camp… we desperately 
want Facebook to succeed in Myanmar.”252 This shows the nuanced role 
that platforms – and corporations generally – play, and whose behavior 
can be regulated by a tort mechanism that would delicately straddle 
the excesses of these “new governors” with that of existing ones. 
Further, through the adjudication of actual disputes, tort law can 
function as a “useful supplement” and “learning and feedback 
mechanism” to inform existing regulation.253 Preliminary injunctive 
relief can also manage risks posed by technology.  
1. Sanction and criminal law’s design 
Imprisonment is criminal law’s defining feature. Criminal law’s 
penalty – deprivation of liberty – explains its design. Fair trial rights, 
a higher burden of proof to convict, a lower standard of proof to assert 
a defense, the presumption of innocence, proving mens rea — these 
guarantees are put in place to protect the individual from undue 
incarceration. This rule applies to corporate officers and agents. If the 
defendant is a corporation, the effect is not the same. Juridical persons 
have “no soul to damn, no body to kick.” 254 In arguing for corporate 
criminal liability, Kaeb proposes a mix of penalties that the ICC can 
impose on corporations as an alternative: “closure of implicated 
corporate units, general confiscation of all the company’s assets (rather 
than the assets only associated with the criminal offense),” the 
“corporate death penalty” – dissolution –  and monitorship.255 Domestic 
legal systems presently allow corporate dissolution for violations that 
are milder in scope than tortious involvement in Rome Statute acts. 
Internationally, I.G. Farben was dissolved pursuant to Control Council 
Law No. 9 as punishment for its involvement in the Holocaust.256 
 
251. BSR Report, supra note 211, at 26. 
252. Id. at 24.  
253. Morgan, supra note 249, at 536 (citing Mary Lyndon, Tort Law and 
Technology, 12 YALE J. OF REG. 137, 157, 165 (1995)).  
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MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting the Lord Chancellor of England 
and suggesting alternative criminal penalties that maximize the 
corporation’s social system and the legal environment to rein in corporate 
behavior). 
255. Kaeb, supra note 196, at 390, 400.  
256. Control Council Law No. 9: Providing for the Seizure of Property Owned 
by I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof, art. I, in 1 ENACTMENTS 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Crime as Cognitive Constraint 
187 
Khanna notes that “a higher standard of proof is only justifiable if 
the cost of a false corporate conviction exceeds the cost of a false 
acquittal.”257 When an individual’s liberty is on the line, proof beyond 
reasonable doubt makes sense. But when the worst form of sanction 
constitutes a fine, it is hard to justify the highest standard of proof for 
the sake of utilizing crime’s symbolic function, which tort also arguably 
possesses.258 Can corporate dissolution, then, be equated to individual 
incarceration? Khanna alternatively proposes a modified form of civil 
liability generally to capture corporate criminal liability’s desirable 
effects while avoiding the latter’s undesirable features.259  
The compensatory nature of tort liability can make it undesirable 
as a cause of action against corporate involvement for Rome Statute 
crimes. Victims may also prefer the symbolic value of the criminal label 
rather than simply calling someone a tortfeasor. The perceived 
equivalence between the punishment upon conviction and the 
seriousness of the content of international crimes conjures a powerful 
image. After all, prisons are “highly visible reminders” of criminal law’s 
deterrent purpose.260 In contrast, pure civil liability for corporations 
may not match the gravity of the acts punishable as Rome Statute 
crimes. Tort law “prices” while criminal law “prohibits.”261 However, 
this concern will similarly beset corporate criminal liability due to the 
inherent impossibility of incarcerating a corporation. Criminal penalties 
will have to come in the form of a fine. Although there is no pricing 
insofar as putting a value to “the illegal benefit to the defendant, but 
rather the cost of preventing the crime to the principal,” it nonetheless 
involves the same transactional analysis “subject to a trade-off.”262 
Viewed in this light, monetary imposition is not so much a point against 
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tort liability for corporations per se inasmuch as it is an argument 
against corporate liability generally. Victims may nonetheless find 
“some satisfaction from the judicial proceeding, the opportunity to tell 
their story in a formal setting and the finding of liability.”263  
More often than not, the threat of reputational harm is more real 
than a fine. When Facebook received international scrutiny for its 
content moderation failures, the threat of reputational damage 
appeared to prompt it to action. In the wake of public condemnation, 
Facebook banned the Tatmadaw commander-in-chief from the 
platform, commissioned a human rights impact assessment on 
Myanmar, hired more human reviewers fluent in Myanmar language, 
rolled out content moderation and transparency initiatives, organized 
worldwide Community Standards fora to better articulate their policy 
to the public, and announced its plan to establish the Facebook 
Oversight Board. 264 Public scrutiny turned out to be a very potent 
behavioral tool. It is also not guaranteed. The threat of litigation can 
pressure companies to internalize the risk of transgression. It eliminates 
the moral hazard caused by corporations’ de facto immunity under the 
current international legal framework. As Steinitz observes, 
corporations operating in transnational contexts have “little incentive 
to act with the kind of care they would exercise if they were to 
internalize the costs of their management decisions.” 265 Yet, there is no 
indication that the threat of penal sanction would more effectively 
reduce this moral hazard. 
B. Cause of action 
In exploring the “applicable law”266 for an ICCJ, Steinitz proposed 
that the ICCJ adjudicate “cross-border mass tort cases.”267 In her view, 
these cases contemplate “the most serious kinds of torts” as well as 
environmental claims.268 It would cover “intentional torts and 
negligence that results in physical injury.”269 Intentional torts can 
include false imprisonment (e.g. slavery, human trafficking), battery 
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(e.g. torture), wrongful death, conversion, trespass to land, and deceit.  
Negligence, on the other hand, would only cover acts or omissions below 
an accepted standard that results in physical injury, “in keeping with 
the emphasis on providing redress for the most serious harms and on 
the pragmatic need not to overburden the court via overly broad 
jurisdiction.”270 
A tort is defined by four basic elements: duty, breach, injury, and 
causation.271 In this section, I will draw in general terms the kind of 
tort that should be cognizable by an ICCJ.  
1. To whom the duty applies: the public-private flip 
The duty applies to corporations that confront state authority. 
Comparison of corporate power to that of the state is often made in the 
context of corporate interference with individual human rights, where 
a corporation wields quasi-sovereign authority against a private 
individual.272 For instance, public-private entanglement characterized 
colonial rule. 273 Traditional cases of business and human rights involved 
various arrangements of complicity between state and non-state 
actors.274 With respect to platforms, collateral censorship involves 
platforms acceding to governmental demands to take down content, 
thereby restricting the individual user’s right to freedom of 
expression.275 In all these examples, state power is affirmed rather than 
challenged, with the corporate entity either supporting or being 
supported by the state to undermine individual human rights.  
Facebook’s ban of Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief from the 
platform was one of the first expressions of the exercise of corporate 
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power wielded against a state actor. It is definitely not the only case to 
raise the issue.276 This embodies Duncan Kennedy’s argument of the 
“loopification” of the public-private distinction discussed in Part 1, 
where, in order to define one category, one needs to come full circle.277 
In this light, Klonick’s description of platforms as the “new 
governors,”278 to the extent that platforms regulate users’ speech, is 
incomplete in incitement contexts such as Myanmar. Here, the new 
governors not only reign over the traditionally governed – the public 
— but even govern the old governors themselves. Although platforms 
can theoretically exercise this power anywhere, and ban the speech of 
other world leaders such as US President Trump, what differentiates 
Myanmar is that here, Facebook, in fact, did, whether rightly or 
wrongly. Here, private power confronts state authority. 
The private-public flip in this case breaks ground. To repeat, it 
deviates from the traditional model of non-state actors’ complicity in 
human rights violations of state actors. This turns on its head the issue 
of vertical and horizontal equalities in tort law. Nathan J. Miller 
highlights the difference between a public agent who commits the wrong 
while exercising a public function and a private individual who commits 
it as such.279 For Miller, “[t]he victim of a public wrong and the alleged 
wrongdoer do not have the same bundle of rights and obligations 
because they are, in a sense, completely different kinds of actors. The 
former is a citizen, but the latter is a representative of the state and an 
extension of the powers granted to it by citizens collectively – such as 
the monopoly over the use of force.”280 Miller makes this distinction to 
argue for a public tort to address human rights abuses perpetrated by 
corporations. The questions posed in this paper, however, are radically 
different from Miller’s premise.281 In Myanmar’s incitement landscape, 
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Facebook’s actions are entirely separate from the actions of inciters and 
speakers, including that of state users. Facebook acted as a private 
entity through and through. Facebook did not act under the color of 
law and did not moderate content at the behest of any state. Whereas 
traditional cases of incitement in international criminal law merged 
control of content producer and owner of technology in one person, I 
demonstrated in Part 3.b. how the social media era has metastasized 
control, which complicates the applicability of criminal law to 
conceptualize the role that platforms play.282 Thus, the role of social 
media platforms in the spread of incitement against the Rohingya is 
different from, say, a local newspaper or radio station publishing or 
airing statements inciting violence against the group. The latter is 
sufficiently regulated by “old-school speech regulation.”283 In contrast, 
social media platform users are not necessarily private citizens, and 
those affected by user content are not limited to platform users.284 The 
issue thus carries interesting implications on the treatment, duties, and 
remedies to be expected from social media platforms as private entities 
embroiled in public harms (e.g. crime). 
2. Duty  
To illustrate tort’s usefulness in conceptualizing corporate harm, I 
tentatively apply one of its classic permutations – negligence – to the 
case study before us. I will analyze Facebook’s role in Myanmar’s 
incitement landscape through this lens. This is not meant to foreclose 
the careful consideration of other torts – nominate or otherwise – or 
various forms of liability (i.e., strict liability, fault-based liability). The 
application here is only meant to display the conceptual possibilities 
offered by tort law in interpreting corporate involvement in mass 
atrocity crimes.  
In laying out the duty of corporations described above, I borrow 
the language of the UNGPs:  
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business 
enterprises: 
(a)Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts 
when they occur; 
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(b)Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that 
are directly linked to their operations, products or services by 
their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to 
those impacts.285 
Borrowing the language of the UNGPs is crucial to achieve 
normative unity with the existing framework for corporate 
responsibility. It can also complement domestic law initiatives 
contained in the draft BHR treaty.286 Applying the tort of negligence 
in the case of Facebook in Myanmar, the duty would look like this: 
The corporation must observe reasonable care that its product, 
service, or operation does not cause, contribute, or be directly 
linked to the perpetration of a Rome Statute crime. 
Reasonable care. Although the UNGPs prescribe the different ways 
that corporations may be involved in a human rights violation (cause-
contribute-linked),287 the tort proposed here intends to prescribe the 
standard of care that corporations must exercise in order to avoid 
liability. Note that reasonable care here is used tentatively. Various 
types of liability can be explored: vicarious liability, strict liability. 
Various defenses can be examined: fulfilling the duty to mitigate and 
prevent, exercising due diligence (such as by conducting a human rights 
impact assessment before commencing in-country operations), 
exercising extraordinary diligence. A finding of fault must be clarified.  
As applied to Facebook’s operation in Myanmar during the relevant 
period, it would appear that Facebook did not exercise reasonable care 
to avoid its product to be directly linked to the spread of incitement 
against the Rohingya. As discussed in the preceding sections, despite 
numerous warnings and alerts from civil society, Facebook did not 
adequately address the problem of hate speech and incitement on the 
platform.288 It noticeably implemented Myanmar-specific improvements 
only in 2018, after the Myanmar tragedy had coincided with other 
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issues.289 There was no indication that a human rights impact 
assessment had been done prior to market entry. 
Rome Statute crime. Negligence is committed when a person or 
corporate entity fails to act diligently to avoid causing injury to 
another. For purposes of the present inquiry, I limit the scope of the 
tortious corporate involvement in a crime to Rome Statute crimes 
(genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crime of aggression). 
These crimes have relatively settled definitions under international law. 
In contrast, “gross violations” of international human rights law and 
other similar terms are not clearly defined.290 The crimes enumerated 
under Article 7 of the draft BHR treaty can also be substituted here, 
but in my view Rome Statute crimes present a more convincing 
framework than the draft BHR treaty’s broader list of offenses. This is 
because Rome Statute crimes represent the “most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole,”291 which, in turn, 
would present the most pressing situations for corporations to avoid 
causing, contributing, or linking their products, services, or operations 
to. This is more so with respect to the jus cogens norms embodied in 
the Genocide Convention.292 A related issue is whether the tort’s 
applicability in war crimes extends to “armed conflict” situations or the 
broader concept of “conflict-affected areas.” Again, I subscribe to the 
Rome Statute standard (i.e., armed conflict) for normative unity. 
3. To whom the duty is owed; causation 
Although the proposed international tort liability is not limited in 
application to social media platforms but to corporations that generally 
meet the limitations drawn here, the case of online incitement presents 
challenging questions for identifying the persons that may be injured 
by platforms operating in incitement contexts. As mentioned, 
incitement affects not only users but also non-users. This is consistent 
with Jeremy Waldron’s view that the harm in hate speech lies in the 
violence inflicted upon the social fabric that shapes public perception 
of a vulnerable group, rather than a specific assault on an individual 
 
289. See Su, supra note 235. 
290. See Roger-Claude Liwanga, The Meaning of Gross Violation of Human 
Rights: A Focus on International Tribunals’ Decisions over the DRC 
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LEGAL ISSUES (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.spacelegalissues.com/jus-
cogens-in-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/R8EK-H5LY]. 
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person’s dignity.293 International criminal jurisprudence on incitement 
similarly betrays this difficulty in their unclear and inconsistent 
application of evidentiary standards and causation analyses in 
prosecuting speakers.294 
Challenges in this area can be partly resolved depending on the 
structure of the tort liability adopted. For instance, if strict liability is 
adopted, then the problem of identifying non-users affected by speech 
on the platform is reduced. In any case, tort law has a looser causation 
requirement than criminal law. 
C. Design 
An international mechanism can provide a cohesive conceptual 
template to assess corporate wrongdoing. For Steinitz, an ICCJ can 
play a “universalizing and harmonizing role.”295 The definition of 
transnational corporate activity under the draft BHR treaty can be 
adopted. Under article 1(3), business activities refer to “any economic 
activity of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
including but not limited to productive or commercial activity, 
undertaken by a natural or legal person, including activities undertaken 
by electronic means.” There is merit in using this definition for an 
international tort liability considering the increasing number of 
corporations that are not characterized by the traditional triggers of 
market entry into a host state. 296 
To bring about an ICCJ, Steinitz proposes the adoption of either 
one of two treaties: one treaty modeled after the Rome Statute creating 
the ICCJ (“ICCJ Statute”), and another treaty modeled after the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (“ICCJ enforcement treaty”).297 These treaties involve a 
separate membership system: 
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[https://perma.cc/HKD7-PEF7]. 
297. See Steinitz, supra note 240, at 145. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
Crime as Cognitive Constraint 
195 
The first treaty would, inter alia, create the court and establish 
its jurisdiction in the territory of states parties... The Rome 
Statute provides a useful example. It established the ICC; 
delimited its relationship with the United Nations; set out, inter 
alia, its jurisdiction; defined the crimes it would adjudicate; 
adopted as law certain general principles of criminal law; 
determined the composition and administration of the court; 
outlined pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures; laid out an 
international cooperation and judicial assistance scheme, 
enforcement procedures, and obligations; and set out financing 
provisions. 
The second treaty… would be an enforcement treaty along the 
lines of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention.
 
Recognition and enforcement
 
are the lynchpins of binding dispute 
resolution, and, as noted throughout, the difficulty plaintiffs 
encounter in obtaining enforceable judgments is the motivating 
problem behind the proposal to set up an ICCJ.298  
The ICCJ Statute is intended for host states where the injury 
usually occurs, while the ICCJ enforcement treaty is meant to attract 
home states of transnational corporations.299 However, corporate 
involvement in Rome Statute crimes may complicate this two-tiered 
membership system. The ICCJ, even if deriving its normative content 
from Rome Statute crimes, must be carefully designed so as not to be 
bound by ICC legal rulings and findings of fact. Suppose the ICCJ were 
to adjudicate a case involving a US company involved in a Rome 
Statute crime in Myanmar, where both the US and Myanmar are not 
state-parties to the Rome Statute. If the ICCJ Statute were designed 
to track the work of the ICC, this would effectively render the work of 
the ICC consequential for parties whose home states are not state 
parties to the Rome Statute. Thus, an independent legal determination 
of the ICCJ seems called for, in the same way that the ICJ is not bound 
by legal determinations of international criminal tribunals on questions 
of general international law.300 
For Steinitz, the complementarity principle in the Rome Statute 
should not apply as an admissibility threshold to the ICCJ because 
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there is no functional equivalent of a prosecutor to speak of.301 Instead, 
“the party responsible for ‘prosecuting’ the claim is the same at the 
international and national levels – the plaintiffs.” 302 This also supports 
her position to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the ICCJ and exclude the 
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies for admissibility. The 
draft BHR treaty, if it takes effect, may change this assessment. 
Nonetheless, other kinds of admissibility thresholds may be 
incorporated. Weighing the perceived advantages of international tort 
liability against its anticipated challenges, there is reason to conclude 
that, at the least, international tort liability merits further exploration.  
V. Conclusion 
As regulatory approaches are currently being explored, 
policymakers should recognize the “implicit central object” of 
platforms, at least in their early days – the Western, white man. Such 
technology was “not developed with partly free countries like Kenya [or 
Myanmar] in mind.”303 With this article, I aimed to show how this gap 
in perspective can impact incitement landscapes. The Facebook 
dilemma illustrates how platforms can be a potent – even deadly – force 
in transitional countries where public infrastructure is weak, democracy 
is fragile, and atrocious acts are unfolding. In such contexts, the need 
to balance competing values of expression and safety becomes more 
pressing, with the scales tipping towards the latter. This article does 
not pretend to provide a magic formula on how to strike this balance; 
it does, however, aim to convince how corporations can be required to 
do so.  
Notably, Facebook’s ban of Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief from 
the platform was not prompted by an official directive from the US 
government (as home state) or the UN.304 Facebook was pressured by 
the court of public opinion.305 However, companies’ profit motive will 
not always align with the public interest, and the court of public 
opinion cannot solely be relied upon as the means to regulate corporate 
involvement in mass atrocity crimes. Thus, there seems to be merit in 
legally regulating corporate behavior.  
This article aimed to set the tone for such future conversations. It 
lays out the conceptual landscape necessary to draw a regulatory 
framework for companies “present” in mass atrocity settings, 
“fostering” atrocity crimes. Facebook’s role in Myanmar’s incitement 
landscape displays other modalities of harm that unsettle current 
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thinking on corporate liability. The issue pushes physical and cognitive 
boundaries to a degree that traditional cases of transnational corporate 
wrongdoing have not. It exposes a gap created by current regimes of 
legal responsibility for international speech crimes, such as for the crime 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. International law 
clearly defines legal responsibility for states and natural persons, but 
an absence of legal liability persists for corporations. A dominant 
discourse that has emerged to address this gap is to expand the universe 
of crime. However, as the Facebook issue has shown, criminal law can 
operate as a cognitive constraint in appreciating harm. This invites us 
to rethink the primacy of crime and its tendency to eclipse other 
discourses. Once freed, a broader network of international liabilities is 
up for imagining. One possibility that merits further consideration is 
tort, writ large on the international plane.  
 
